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THE AVID SPORTSMAN AND THE SCOPE FOR SELFPROTECTION: WHEN EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
SHOULD BE ENFORCED
Robert Heidt *

I. INTRODUCTION

"Life is either a daringadventure or nothing."
Helen Keller
The expansion of tort liability since the 1960s has coincided
with a sharp curtailment of the availability of some recreational
activities. 1 For instance, the percentage of hotel, motel, and
YMCA swimming pools that offer the use of one and three-meter
diving boards has plummeted.2 Likewise, the percentage of horseriding stables that offer the opportunity to ride a horse unaccom-

*

Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).

1. See Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory
Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1997) (examining the rising costs of liability insurance); Gil B. Fried, Punitive Damages and Corporate
Liability Analysis in Sports Litigation, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 45, 48-49 (1998) (discussing
the extent to which the liability expense of recreational vendors has increased); see also
James M. Garner, The Louisiana 1988 Products Liability Reform Act: The Changes and
Their Effect, 5 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 129, 165-66 (1990). Yet while the liability expense of
vendors has increased, the injury rate from the vendors' activities has decreased. See
Larry Weisman, Risk All in the Game, But Costly, USA TODAY, July 28, 1987, at Cl,
available at 1987 WL 4572449. For a general description on this curtailment of activities,
see Marcia Chambers, Whatever Happened to the Sandlot?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at
15.
2. See Jane E. Brody, Think Before You Dive, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1994, at 7. See also
Greg Sobo, Note, Look Before You Leap: Can the Emergence of the Open and Obvious Danger Defense Save Diving from Troubled Waters?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 175, 175-77 (1998)
(illustrating how tort law has affected the availability of diving facilities for amateurs and
professionals alike).
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panied, 3 the percentage of ski areas that offer ungroomed intermediate runs,4 the percentage of boat renting companies that offer power boats for water-skiing,' and the percentage of schools
and day care centers that offer playground equipment have also
declined.6 Some activities, such as rented time on a trampoline7 or
on a mechanized bull have virtually disappeared,' perhaps because neither the recreational vendors who offer them nor the
manufacturer who produced the product could sanitize the activity in a manner which would reduce the vendor's liability to injured patrons.9 While courts and commentators continue to suggest that the expansion of the recreational vendors' liability
comes at the expense of either the vendors themselves, or perhaps, their liability insurers,1 ° the primary victims of the expan-

3. See Lee Condon, The Commerce of Camps: Making Profit from Play, L.A. TIMES,
June 6, 2000, at B6; Antoinette Fitch, Riding Without the Law: Horse Clubs, Owners and
Breeding Farms Paying High Insurance Premiums in the Face of Possible Liability Lawsuits Say They Are Struggling To Stay Alive. Now They're Looking Toward State Government for Protection., PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 23, 2000, at W-1. Rising liability and insurance costs have not only affected unguided trail riding, they have also forced some
equine entrepreneurs to stop offering guided trail rides. See Stephanie Scott, Wisconsin
Equine Entrepreneurs, Enthusiasts Find Joys of Hobby Surpass Costs, POST-CRESCENT
(Appleton, Wis.), July 21, 2000, available at 2001 WL 10114290; Dru Wilson, City Won't
Offer New Contract to Stable, GAZETTE (Colorado Springs, Colo.) July 11, 2000, at Metro 2,
availableat 2000 WL 19083522.
4. Al Sokol, Insurance Crisis Means Fun Runs Are No Longer Fun, TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 16, 1986, at E6. Ungroomed intermediate runs reappeared somewhat in New England in the mid-90s. See Tony Chamberlain, No Boundaries:Some Areas Are Allowing Skiers Off the Beaten Path,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1995, at A8; Allen Lessels, Ski Managers
Add More Gusto, N.H. WKLY., Dec. 17, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL 5966943.
5. David G. Brown, Powerboat Rentals: Are They Coming or Going?, BOATING INDUS.
INT'L ONLINE, Oct. 1, 1996, at 25, available at 1996 WL 9735056.
6. See Andrea Billups, Educators Learn From Lawsuits, But the Fear of Costly Litigation Haunts Teachers, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at C1, available at 1999 WL
3099467; Laird Harrison, Where Have All the Swing Sets Gone?, TIME, May 14, 2001, at
29; Anjetta McQueen, Liabilities, Threats Burden Schools, AP ONLINE, Sept. 9, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 22042246.
7. See Cindy Oakes, Note, Florida'sBungee Jumping Regulations: Why Other States
Should Take the Plunge, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 189, 210-12 (1993) (discussing
the emergence and subsequent decline of the trampoline industry in the 1950s and 1960s).
8. See Babine v. Gilley's Bronco Shop, Inc., 488 So.2d 176, 177-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Van Tuyn v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 318, 320-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty,Chaos, and the Torts Process:An Economic Analysis of
Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 389-92 (1991).
9. This list of recreational activities which have become less available is not comprehensive. It is merely a representative sample.
10. See, e.g., John Elliot Leighton, Swimming Pools, Trampolines, and Other Backyard Activities-Fun Might Not Be Fun, 1 Ann. 2000 ATLA CLE 695 (2000) (seeing vendors and their insurers as the only victims of increased liability).
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sion of liability are the avid sportsmen who now search in vain for
the activities they love.
This article discusses the liability rules that should govern
when the recreational vendor who offers these activities is sued
for negligence by an injured patron. The article does not discuss
the rules that should govern the liability of a manufacturer or
other seller of a recreational product, although much that is said
here may be pertinent to that liability. The article contends that
courts should handle lawsuits by injured patrons against recreational vendors by more faithfully enforcing the patron's pre-injury
agreement to release the vendor from liability for injuries caused
by its negligence.1 1 Currently too many courts refuse to enforce
these exculpatory agreements, also known as releases.12 Once the
presence of such a release is established, a court should routinely
dismiss the patron's action against the vendor without the need
for further discovery of the circumstances surrounding the injury
(i.e., enforcing the release calls for granting the vendor's motions
for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment). The article does acknowledge some limits to the protection the release
should afford. While the release should protect the vendor from
liability for its negligence or recklessness, a court should not enforce the release if it concludes that the vendor's behavior, as alleged in the patron's complaint, rises to the level of "outrageous."1 3 Upon reaching that conclusion, the court should let the
patron's case proceed. If at the close of the patron's case in chief,
and at the close of all the evidence, the court still deems the vendor's conduct outrageous, then the release would be deemed unenforceable. The judicial finding of outrageousness then could be
thought of as a threshold requirement that must be met before
voiding the release and allowing the case to proceed under the

11. To be sure, some of the recreational vendors mentioned in this article, such as motels and ski areas, do not currently use release agreements. The routine enforcement of
releases proposed in this article should eventually elicit their wider use.
12. See infra notes 43-47.
13. Perhaps the best description of the conduct to be deemed "outrageous" is conduct
which Professor Owen describes as an "extreme departure from accepted safety norms."
David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturersof Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27 (1982). Unlike a finding that the vendor intended to
cause injury, a finding that the vendors conduct was outrageous would not currently
threaten the vendor's coverage under the typical liability insurance policy. KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM,INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 444 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that the only current exclusion based on the insured's culpability is for harm expected or intended by the
insured).
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current test for vendor liability-typically negligence.1 4 In addition, the release should be ignored when the injury occurs in a
context in which the patron lacks significant opportunity for selfprotection.' 5 For example, while the release should bar a ski
area's liability for a skier's injuries while skiing (unless the court
deems the ski area's alleged behavior outrageous), the release
would have no effect on the liability of the ski area for injuries to
skiers from the collapse of a chair-lift. While the release should
bar an amusement park's liability for the nausea, nightmares,
headaches and sore necks patrons suffer from the normal operation of its rides, the release would have no effect on the liability of
the amusement park for injuries to patrons from a ride derailing.
While no jurisdiction has embraced this proposed rule, many
have abandoned their centuries-old commitment to negligence as
the standard for liability when the plaintiff was injured while
participating in recreational activities. Those jurisdictions have
opted instead for a significantly heightened standard for liability,
namely, that a defendant's behavior be reckless or worse than

14. With cases that reach the jury, the judicial finding that the vendor's conduct was
outrageous would never affect the jury instructions or deliberations.
Nor would the judicial determination of whether the vendor's conduct-as alleged in the
patron's complaint-was outrageous duplicate the jury determination of whether the vendor's conduct-as shown at trial-was negligent. Apart from the different record on which
the two determinations are based, there are two separate issues which call for separate
resolution. First, the court should determine the enforceability of the release. Second, in
the absence of an enforceable release, the jury should determine whether the vendor was
negligent provided, of course, sufficient evidence exists for a sensible jury to decide that
issue either way.
15. When the patron has a significant opportunity for self-protection, the risks he
faces from the recreational activity can be viewed as patron-controlled or at least patroninfluenced. The extent of patron influence suggests that patrons are either the cheaper
precaution-takers or will possess an opportunity to adjust to the vendor's previous negligence. A skier, for example, can typically adjust his skiing to accommodate any negligence
by the ski area in failing to groom slopes or to otherwise eliminate natural hazards on the
slopes. When the patron is the cheaper precaution-taker or can adjust to the vendor's previous negligence, there is a strong utilitarian case for denying liability in order to maintain the incentive for the patron to take care. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 154 (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 88-96 (1987).
Moreover, in such situations the release may make perfect sense to a rational patron because the patron may prefer to substitute more of his own care for the vendor's care. Patrons may desire this substitution when they believe the precautions available to themselves are superior and will alone suffice, when they believe any precautions by the vendor
are likely to spoil the aesthetic and other benefits of the recreation, and when they derive
satisfaction from taking care. Indeed taking care to protect themselves may be part of the
pleasure and challenge of the activity. For more defense of the proposed rule and an explanation of how it is to be administered, see infra Part IV.
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reckless.16 To be sure, the courts requiring more than negligence
have been addressing a different context than that discussed
here. In those cases, an injured participant was suing another individual participant and not, as here, a business vendor whom
the injured patron paid for providing or allowing access to the activity. 7 The earlier cases requiring more than negligence have
also involved injury to participants in highly organized, competitive athletic events taking place in relatively formal settings."
But the rule requiring more than negligence has been extended to
cooperative recreational activities in informal settings.1 9 The California Supreme Court, for example, has recognized that while
negligence is the usual standard for liability, the negligence standard is inappropriate when an injured participant in a recreational activity-whether competitive or cooperative and regardless of the formality of the setting-sues another participant
whose negligence caused the injury.2 ° Instead, liability should
only be imposed when the defendant-participant's conduct is
deemed so reckless as to be "totally outside the range of the ordi-

16. See, e.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 339 (Conn. 1997) (applying a recklessness standard to all team contact sports); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that a soccer player is liable for injury in a tort action if his
behavior is deliberate, willful, or reckless); Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 419-20 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001) (applying a recklessness or intentional standard for voluntary sports activities); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Ky. 1995) (applying a recklessness or intentional standard to injuries sustained in a tennis match); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964,
968 (N.Y. 1986) (applying a recklessness standard when one jockey crossed into another
jockey's lane causing injuries); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: ParticipantLiability to
Co-Participantsfor Injuries Sustained During Competition, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L.
REV. 191, 195-98 (1990) (finding the recklessness standard to be the modern trend).
17. See supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
19. See, e.g., Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Neb. 1990) (applying a willful or
reckless disregard of safety standard to an injury arising from a church pickup basketball
game); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, 702-03 (Ohio 1990) (holding that participants
in recreational or sports activities assume the ordinary risk of these activities and cannot
recover for the injury unless the injury was intentional); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d
486, 488-89 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding damages for an injury sustained in a recreational
polo match are only recoverable when recklessness is shown).
20. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710-11 (Cal. 1992) (finding the negligence
standard inappropriate in the context of a pickup football game); see also Cheong v.
Antablin, 946 P.2d 817, 820-21 (Cal. 1997) (finding the negligence standard inappropriate
in the context of a skiing accident). The Knight court's approach has been followed in other
states. E.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604-05 (N.J. 1994). But see Graven v. Vail
Assocs., Inc., 909 P.2d 514, 520-21 (Colo. 1995) (finding that negligence is the proper standard in claims where a ski area operator failed to mark a dangerous area); Lestina v. West
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 32-33 (Wis. 1993) (embracing the negligence standard).
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nary [conduct] involved in the sport"-the standard referred to
here as outrageous. 1 And just as the California Supreme Court's
rule was based on the recognition that "vigorous participation" in
athletic competitions-there a pickup touch football game"likely would be chilled" if liability arose from "ordinary careless
conduct,"2 2 so too the rule proposed here stems in part from recognition that imposing liability for negligence will unduly chill
vendors from offering vigorous recreational activities.23
Admittedly, the appropriate standard of culpability for prima
facie liability, the issue in Knight, bears no obvious relation to the
appropriate standard for deciding whether to enforce a properly
worded release.2 4 Conventionally, the former concerns a plaintiffs
prima facie showing, the latter a defense. The former focuses on a
defendant's conduct in regard to the risk of injury, the latter on
the significance afforded the plaintiffs attitude toward the risk of
injury. Little seems to be gained, and much lost, by conflating the
two. If one claims, as this Article does, that the law treats the defendant vendors, and through them the avid sportsman, with undue harshness, one logically should call for raising the standard
for prima facie liability from negligence to outrageousness. That
approach, while more logical and straightforward, is not advocated here for at least two practical reasons. First, replacing the
current negligence standard for prima facie liability with an "outrageousness" standard even when no release has been signed is
too radical and sweeping a change for widespread acceptance. Defendant's argument for an "outrageousness" standard is stronger
when plaintiff has clearly agreed in advance, under circumstances which do not suggest any coercion, to release defendant
from liability for its negligence. Moving to an "outrageousness"
standard only in the face of a release is a more incremental
change. Second, if "outrageousness" became the test for defendant's prima facie liability, then the ancient and entrenched tra-

21. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
22. Id.
23. The Knight court refused to resolve suits arising from athletic competitions by ascertaining the scope of the plaintiffs consent and instead focused on the culpability of defendant's behavior and whether deeming that behavior actionable would discourage desirable recreational activities. See id. at 723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. See Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The issue
is not whether the Colorado General Assembly has limited landowner liability.... Rather,
it is whether.., an exculpatory clause is valid."); Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127
F.3d 1273, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 1997).
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ditions of the common law would insist that the jury decide
whether defendant's conduct rose to that level. 25 "Outrageousness" would be deemed a jury issue just as certainly and universally as "negligence" and "recklessness" have been deemed jury
issues. And like "negligence" and "recklessness," which call both
for evaluation and for fact-finding, it would rarely be appropriate
for resolution before the end of trial. Hence suits against the defendant-vendors would still be likely to subject the vendors to the
expense of discovery and trial, and to the risk of jury sympathy
for the injured plaintiff. Defendants' expected liability and their
liability insurer's charges and requirements would not decline
significantly, and they would not return to offering the activities
the avid sportsman loves. Whether a release is enforceable, on the
other hand, is an issue more likely to be decided by the court on
pretrial motions. 26 Even when enforceability turns on the culpability of defendant's conduct (i.e., whether defendant's conduct as
alleged in the pleadings can be deemed "reckless," "willful or
wanton," "gross negligence," or "outrageous"), the enforceability
issue could be assigned to the court and decided before trial without too much violence to the long traditions of the common law.27
Once releases are routinely enforced before trial and before discovery, the liability expense of the recreational vendors should
decrease significantly.
There is nothing new about allowing the enforceability of a release to turn in part on the culpability of the alleged conduct the

25. See Arango & Trueba, supra note 1, at 35-45.
26. Both the enforceability and interpretation of releases are for the courts. See Zollman v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923, 928 (D. Utah 1992) (determining that the release was not
too ambiguous and denying summary judgment); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving
Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (granting summary judgment because exculpatory agreement was enforceable); Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 789
(Wash. 1996) (finding agreement unenforceable and upholding summary judgment);
Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 1986) (affirming summary judgment because indemnity agreement was valid).
27. E.g., Neuchatel Ins. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 96-5396, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17692, at *39 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1998) (enforcing release where defendant's behavior was
not gross negligence and granting summary judgment); Lahey v. Covington, 964 F. Supp.
1440, 1446 (D. Colo. 1996); Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 565,
570 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Potter v. Nat'l Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1411-12 (D.
Colo. 1994) (enforcing release and granting summary judgment because the court found no
'willful or wanton" behavior by defendant); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d
781, 785 (Colo. 1989) (enforcing release and granting summary judgment, holding that
"[ilt is difficult to imagine any claim that Simkin could have asserted against Heil Valley
that would not have been based, at bottom, on negligence.").
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release would shield. Several courts have suggested that releases
enforced to bar liability for negligence will not be enforced to protect conduct more culpable than negligence.2" And nearly every
tort defense, of which contributory negligence is the most obvious,
is lost to the intentional wrongdoer.2 9
For nearly forty years, the prevailing test for determining the
enforceability of a release from liability for negligence has been
3" In
the test of Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California.
Tunkl, the California Supreme Court struck down a release given
on admission by a hospital patient who was now claiming malpractice. 1 The court set forth a list of factors which should determine whether a release is enforced. 2 One of those factors
strongly supports the proposed rule. Releases are suspect, the
court said, when "as a result of the transaction, the person or
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller,
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents."33

28. See K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 541 P.2d 1378, 1382 (Ore. 1975) (noting
that a release is enforceable for negligence but not for gross negligence, recklessness or
willful and wanton behavior); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 509
n.6 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that the release is enforceable in common law negligence action
but not in action based on a breach of a statutory safety standard or recklessness). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "clauses exempting the defendant from all
liability for negligence will not be construed to include intentional or reckless misconduct,
or extreme or unusual kinds of negligence, unless such intention clearly appears."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. d (1965).
29. See FDIC v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 431 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that under Florida law contributory negligence is no defense to an action sounding in trover and conversion) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965));
McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494, 497 (Me. 1990) ('"[clontributory negligence never has been considered a good defense to an intentional tort.'") (quoting W. Page
Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 at 477-78 (5th ed. 1984)).
See also Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that parental immunity is no defense to intentional torts); Morgan v. Johnson, 976 P.2d 619, 620
(Wash. 1999) (holding that the intoxication defense is unavailable in an intentional tort).
Should courts dramatically water down the intent required for an intentional tort to, say
"exposing another to a known risk," then releases of liability for intentional torts should be
enforced. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572, 578 (Ohio
1982) (broadening the concept of intent so as to avoid Worker's Compensation Act exemption of employer from liability for negligence).
30. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). Tunkl's refusal to enforce a mandatory arbitration system as an alternative to malpractice liability was overruled in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976).
31. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 448-49.
32. Id. at 445-46.
33. Id. at 446. An alternative criteria for enforcing releases is whether the release
agreement imposes external costs on others. Because a recreational release does not affect
the liability of either the vendor or the patron toward others injured by the recreational
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The rule proposed in this article can be reduced to a mere interpretation of this "control" factor. Under the proposed rule, releases would be enforced, absent outrageous behavior by the vendor, as long as the patron at the time of injury was not so under
the vendor's control that the patron no longer retained significant
opportunity for self-protection.
Any proposed rule must meet the challenge of not extending
into settings where it does not belong. Enforcing releases on behalf of recreational vendors does not call for enforcing releases in
industrial accident, medical malpractice, or automotive design
settings, for example. A release given by a worker to the manufacturer of the industrial equipment that the worker uses should
not allow the manufacturer to avoid liability for his negligence.
Nor should the releases given by a patient to a doctor or a car
buyer to the car's manufacturer allow the doctor or manufacturer
to avoid liability for negligence. A major theme of this article is
that recreational activities differ significantly from many other
activities which give rise to tort liability because there is a positive social value in leaving patrons free to deal with the activities'
risks, including those risks that can be said to come from the
vendor's negligence.3 4 Hence, in recreational settings, the law
should not pressure vendors to sanitize their activities through
the taking of every precaution which a judge or jury, often mistakenly, may deem cost-justified.
Part II of the article describes the current law affecting the recreational vendor and evaluates the likely effect of that law. Part
III discusses the social value of the recreational activities whose
availability has decreased. Part IV explains the proposed rule and
defends it. Part V concludes.

activity, this criterion also favors enforcing the release.
34. Another obvious difference is that in the industrial accident, medical malpractice,

and automotive design settings, the plaintiff is less likely to be the cheaper accidentavoider, either by taking precautions or by lowering his activity level. Consider the worker
using a drill press who, through momentary inadvertence, catches and loses a finger in the
press. Because the cost of the worker guarding against any momentary inadvertence is
prohibitive and because the worker's care is stochastic, the worker is unable to wholly
avoid the possibility of injuring himself. And avoiding the accident through the worker
opting for a lower activity level by avoiding that work may also be prohibitively costly.
When the manufacturer could have designed some cost-justified engineering safeguard
which would have protected the worker from his momentary inadvertence, the manufacturer is rightly seen as the cheaper accident-avoider, a factor which supports manufacturer liability. In the recreational settings discussed here, the patron is much more likely
to be the cheaper accident-avoider either by taking precautions or by avoiding the activity
until he is better prepared.
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II. THE CURRENT LAW AND ITS EFFECTS

A. The CurrentLaw
"It is only by risking our person from one hour to another that
we live at all."
William James
Not all courts show hostility toward a patron's release of a recreational vendor from liability for the vendor's negligence. In a
great many cases courts have enforced releases and have terminated the injured patron's negligence suit against the vendor before trial." Typically the ground for enforcing a release is that the
Tunkl criteria support enforcement. The criterion most often invoked is that the vendor is not "engaged in performing a service
of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public."36
Nevertheless almost every jurisdiction contains cases where
courts have voided or circumvented the release and have allowed

35.

See, e.g., Gambino v. Music Television, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1399, 1401-02 (M.D. Fla.

1996) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant sponsor of an obstacle course
based on an exculpatory clause contained in a registration form signed by plaintiff prior to
participation); Szczotka v. Snowridge, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 247, 251 (D. Vt. 1994) (granting
summary judgment for defendant ski resort based on a release signed by the plaintiff as a
condition of renting skiing equipment); Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813,
826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding summary judgment in favor of defendant ski resort
based on a release signed in connection with skiing lessons); McAtee v. Newhall Land &
Farming Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 465, 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (granting summary judgment for
defendant river rafting vendor based on a release); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Ctr., 214
Cal. Rptr. 194, 200, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defendant
skydiving vendor based on a release); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc.,
392 N.W.2d 727, 731-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant skydiving club based on a release signed by the plaintiff prior to a parachute
jump); Finkler v. Toledo Ski Club, 577 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (upholding
summary judgment in favor of defendant ski club based on a release included in decedent's
original club membership application); Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902, 903-04 (Tenn.
1960) (summary judgment in favor of defendant stable based on a release); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 636 P.2d 492, 494 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (granting judgment for
defendant mountain climbing vendor based on a release).
36. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445. Of the decisions listed in note 35, those upholding releases
under Tunkl include Husley, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 199 and McAtee, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
No court has held that enforcement of the release depends on the criterion proposed
here, namely, whether the patron at the time of injury possessed an opportunity for selfprotection.
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injured patrons who merely show the vendor's negligence to prevail. Some courts hostile to recreational releases have nullified
them as violations of public policy.3 7 Other hostile courts narrow
recreational releases into oblivion by insisting that they identify
the risk that materialized or the activity from which the injury
arose with a specificity that the vendor, drafting ex ante, cannot
possibly achieve. In Dobratz v. Thomson,38 for instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a release signed by participants in
a water-skiing show on public policy grounds. The court, however,
found the release inapplicable because it applied to injuries suffered "in the event" and "in competition" rather than in a "ski
show," and because it did not specify "what particular sorts of skiing stunts [were to be performed] ... [or their] level of difficulty
and dangerousness."3 9 Some courts nullify releases on grounds
which stand as a tribute to judicial ingenuity. The Supreme Court
of Idaho, for example, held that while a release extinguished the
common law negligence action of a patron of a horse-riding stable,
a state statute which merely restated the usual duty "to 'conform
to the standard of care expected of members of [the] profession'
created a statutory cause of action which the release did not affect.4" Until recently, perhaps the most popular, if disingenuous,
method for nullifying a recreational release was to claim that the
language of the release was ambiguous in that it could be read to
cover only injuries occurring in the absence of the vendor's negli37. See, e.g., Coughlin v. T.M.H. Int'l Attractions, 895 F. Supp. 159, 162 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (invalidating release signed by participant in guided cave tour because of state's
public policy against enforcing release agreements); Weiner v. Mt. Airy Lodge, Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 342, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (denying motion to dismiss strict liability count because as
a matter of public policy, "strict liability should not be disclaimed"); Williams v. United
States, 660 F. Supp. 699, 703 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (holding that an agreement releasing the
United States Air Force of liability during an air R.O.T.C. program violated public policy
by permitting the government to assume care and custody without any policy encouraging
the exercise of reasonable care); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 800 (Vt. 1995) (holding release agreement in favor of a ski resort unenforceable because of public interest in
assuring that ski areas maintain reasonably safe premises); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992) (invalidating exculpatory clause because it violates public policy to allow parents to waive the rights of their children). In New York the legislature at one point voided recreational releases. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326
(McKinney 1978). This statute now is understood to void releases only where the recreation is paid for and where the release appears as small print on the back of tickets. See
Geise v. County of Niagara, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Blanc v. Windham
Mountain Club, Inc., 454 N.Y.S.2d 383, 389-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
38. 468 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991).
39. Id. at 661.
40. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361, 364 (Idaho 1984) (quoting Idaho Code § 361204 (Michie 1987)).
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gence." Hence, the contract interpretation principle-that the release should be construed against the drafter-rendered the release inapplicable as long as the negligence of the vendor was alleged.4 2 Because the vendor would not have been liable in the
absence of its negligence whether the release existed or not, this
approach nullified the release entirely." Since the 1980s, however, a consensus seems to have emerged that wording the release to apply to injuries "arising from the vendor's negligence"
will render it unambiguous in this respect, and this method of
overcoming the release is rarely seen today." Finally, some courts
which ultimately rule for the vendor based on the release undermine the release's purpose by finding that the significance of the
release cannot be determined until the end of trial.45 As the California Court of Appeal has emphasized:
In cases arising from hazardous recreational pursuits, to permit released claims to be brought to trial defeats the purpose for which releases are requested and given, regardless of which party ultimately
wins the verdict. Defense costs are devastating. Unless courts are
willing to dismiss such actions without trial, many popular
and law46
ful recreational activities are destined for extinction.

41. See, e.g., Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996) ("The Yaugers
argue that the ambiguity in the language of the exculpatory contract renders it unenforceable.").
42. See, e.g., Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (10th Cir.
1978) (ruling under Colorado law that a release signed in connection with a purchase of a
season pass did not free defendant from liability for injuries sustained when plaintiff collided with ski-lift pole because it failed expressly to exonerate the defendant for its negligence); Ferrell v. S. Nev. Off Road Enthusiasts, Ltd., 195 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that a release's failure to mention negligence renders it irrelevant); Celli v.
Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that "pit
passes" signed by plaintiffs spectators at an auto race did not exonerate defendant from
liability because they failed to state explicitly that the signors released the defendant from
liability for its own negligent conduct); Bernstein v. Seacliff Beach Club, Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d
567, 569 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1962) (holding that a clause in plaintiffs membership application
that purported to waive all claims of injury was insufficient to free defendant from liability
for negligence); Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 65 (holding a release agreement included in ski
area's application for a season pass unenforceable as against public policy because it failed
to clearly inform the signer that he accepted the risk of the defendant's negligence).
43.

See, e.g., Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 65.

44. See, e.g., Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 826 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (upholding summary judgment for defendant ski resort based on signed release in
which plaintiff agreed not to sue defendant for its negligence); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley
Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a release that
stated that defendant would be free from liability for "negligence implied or otherwise").
45. E.g., Buchan v. U.S. Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 887, 894-95 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).

46.

Nat'l & Int'l Bhd. of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
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Of course the serious possibility that the release will not be enforced would raise the vendor's costs less if the vendor could escape the expense and disruption of discovery and trial on other
grounds.4 ' But the current law of negligence and of civil procedure provides few such grounds. Unlike criminal procedure in
most states,48 the civil procedure to be followed in negligence
cases offers no way for a defendant to force a preliminary determination of whether the action against it possesses some threshold merit. And unlike the procedure in contract cases, where the
key elements will eventually be put into the relatively predictable
hands of a judge, the key elements in a negligence action are all
for the jury. No matter how carefully the vendor conducted himself, the elements of negligence and cause in fact being for the
jury, the vendor cannot draw the court's attention to the lack of
evidence of those elements until the end of the patrons' case-inchief at trial.49 The expense of defending the vendor to that stage
is suggested by insurance data indicating that the costs of defense
now often exceed the indemnity limits of the vendor's liability in50
surance.
The ongoing study of the relative merits of the American Rule,
which bars a successful litigant from recovering his litigation expenses, and the English Rule, which awards successful litigants
these expenses, suggests that a major shortcoming of the American Rule is the temptation put before injured persons to bring
frivolous suits. 1 This temptation becomes most acute when three
conditions are met." The first condition is that potential damages
are high, even though the chance of prevailing is remote.53 The
second condition is that the mere advancement of the suit will
subject the defense to substantial expense, 54 and the third condition is that the injured person is able to hire an attorney under a

264 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46-47 (1989).
47. See Buchan, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
48. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5-7.
49. Buchan, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
50. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L.
REV. 1, 38-39 (1999).
51. J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of
Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEG.
STUD. 451, 457, 460-61 (1988).

52. Id. at 460-61.
53. Id. at 460.
54.

Id. at 461.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:381

contingency fee agreement." All three conditions exist in our current tort system.5 6 Hence our system tempts injured patrons to
bring frivolous tort suits against vendors much more than it
tempts other potential plaintiffs to bring, say, frivolous contract
suits.5 Because frivolous suits are more likely in torts, courts
should search more assiduously than in other areas of law for
some method of identifying frivolous tort suits early and of containing the expense those suits inflict on defendants.
The consequences for a vendor when the release is overcome do
not cease once the plaintiff patron concludes his case-in-chief. At
that point-when the vendor can finally force the court to decide
whether the evidence of the vendor's causal negligence is sufficient-the weakness of the modern meaning of negligence comes
into play and nearly assures that the court will be unwilling to
grant the vendor a directed verdict. While negligence at one time
meant failure to provide average care or failure to provide the
care which would have been provided by a reasonable person, it
has evolved to mean the mere failure to provide any cost-justified
precaution.5" In their universal adoption of the Learned Hand test
for negligence, courts have implicitly assumed that a reasonable
person would take every cost-justified precaution. That one who
takes every cost-justified precaution is acting with optimal (i.e.,
perfect) care and hence that this meaning of negligence requires
perfection is rarely noticed. 9 The many older opinions in which
courts have sharply distinguished sub-optimal behavior from negligent behavior seem to be ignored.6 ° One consequence is that in

55. Id.
56. Id. at 460-61.
57. See id.
58. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating
Judge Hand's cost justification test for determining negligence); see also Michael D. Green,
Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts>,75 TEx. L. REV. 1605, 1615-43 (1997) (examining the development of the negligence standard from the reasonable person test to the
economic efficiency model of Hand and Posner).
59. Acting with greater care than that required by the Learned Hand test is suboptimal because it means providing care that at the margin costs more than the safety
benefits it provides. For a discussion of the apparent infallibility required of tort defendants by the Learned Hand test, without recognition that requiring infallibility requires
more than reasonable care, see Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology,
Nondurable Precautions,and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293
(1988). See also Mark F. Grady, Discontinuitiesand Information Burdens: A Review of The
Economic Structure of Tort Law by Landes and Posner, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658 (1988).
60. See, e.g., Saunders v. Boston & Maine R.R., 136 A. 264, 265-66 (N.H. 1927) (finding defendant not negligent despite failing to take precaution of equipping trolley with a
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order to reach a jury, a patron need only advance sufficient evidence of some untaken precaution or some safer alternative affirmative act which would have been cost-justified and which
would probably have avoided or reduced the patron's injury. This
shift in the meaning of negligence may have hurt recreational
vendors especially. Anyone leading a group of horse riders would
concede that each outing includes many moments when the
leader fails to take every precaution which a judge or jury may
later deem cost-justified.
In pointing to the vendor's untaken precaution, a process one
could call selecting plaintiffs theory of causal negligence, the patron cannot be accused of viewing the injury ex post. For the patron is saying "here is a precaution that would have probably reduced the patron's injury and that one in the vendor's position,
acting ex ante, should have known was cost-justified and safer
overall (i.e., not just in regard to the risk that materialized, but in
regard to all reasonably foreseeable risks)." Second guessing the
vendor's behavior in order to suggest a theory of causal negligence does not require the hindsight of an ex post perspective, although the patron can count on the hindsight of the judge and
jury to emphasize the safety payoff of his proposed precaution.
This modern meaning of negligence encourages relentless second-guessing. Attorneys are trained to engage in this secondguessing until conjuring up untaken precautions that are plausibly cost-justified and that would probably have reduced the patron's injury becomes second-nature. Identifying such untaken
precautions becomes like shuffling through a rabbit-eared deck of
cards to pick out the hand that just beats the vendor's. In the
typical horse-riding injury case against the renting stable, the
plaintiff patron can pick his alternative theories of causal negli-

jack); Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941); Watkins v.
Taylor Furnishing Co., 31 S.E.2d 917, 918 (N.C. 1944) (stating that the measure of care in
North Carolina is that of the ordinarily prudent, not the perfectly prudent, man); Porter v.
Cook, 13 S.E.2d 486, 488 (S.C. 1941) (holding that a driver was not guilty of negligence
"even though he did not make the wisest choice"). Professor Schwartz summarized the pre1960 notion of negligence as requiring '"clear moral culpability substantially antagonistic
to social norms.'" Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
ModernAmerican Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 623 n.104 (1992).
The ancient common law rule that minors and those with certain physical disabilities
will be held to a lower standard of care also seems contrary to the notion that negligence
means neglect of any cost-justified precaution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 912
(Tentative Draft 2002).
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gence from a deck which includes the following: (1) The stable did
not adequately interview the patron to ascertain his level of skill
and experience before allowing him to ride; (2) The stable did not
select an appropriately low-spirited horse for the patron; (3) The
stable did not adequately warn him about the risks of walking or
standing behind a horse; (4) The stable strapped on the saddle or
bridle too tightly, hence increasing the risk of the horse becoming
irritated and misbehaving, or too loosely, hence increasing the
risk of the saddle shifting or sliding; (5) The stable did not adequately instruct the patron about how to stop, turn, calm, or otherwise manage the horse; (6) The stable did not adequately warn
him about the particular horse's characteristics or the risks of
this particular trail; (7) The stable chose a trail that was inappropriately steep or rocky or that created a risk of jumping over tree
limbs or ditches or that encountered other undue hazards; (8) The
stable did not adequately maintain the trail; (9) The stable began
the ride at an inappropriate time in light of the horse's habits or
condition; (10) The stable continued the ride for an inappropriate
time or distance; (11) The stable did not respond appropriately to
the complaints of the patron during the ride; and (12) The stable
did not behave appropriately during or after the patron's injury.6 1
While the circumstances of each patron's injury will instantly
render inapplicable many of these theories of causal negligence,
those circumstances will also suggest additional specific theories
which that patron can advance. The ease of advancing a theory of
causal negligence-and modern procedure encourages a plaintiff
to advance multiple, alternative theories-contrasts with the intellectual labor a conscientious trial judge must undertake to
evaluate whether there is sufficient evidence in support of the
theory, not to mention the labor required to explain why there is

61. For cases where those theories of negligence have been advanced, although not
necessarily with success, see Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 441 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (finding a stable negligent for saddling a horse too tightly); Raveson v. Walt Disney
World Co., 793 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding a stable negligent for
failing adequately to train the horse and the supervising employees); Gober v. Nolan, 57
S.E.2d 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950) (finding a stable negligent for giving a patron a too-spirited
horse); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 673 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding a riding school negligent for failure to warn the plaintiff that a previously learned riding technique was dangerous to use with their horses and for promoting the plaintiff from
beginner to advanced before she had learned to manage the horses safely); Amado v.
Malibu Dude Ranch, 98 A.2d 121, 123 (N.J. 1953) (finding a stable negligent for not warning about the possible harm from bees).
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not.62 The trial judge knows that he undertakes this evaluation in
the shadow of the deeply entrenched principle that negligence
and cause-in-fact, whenever sensible minds can differ, are for the
jury.
The triumph of the Learned Hand test may have also hurt the
avid sportsman because of the risk that the test will be misapplied to the vendor's operation of its recreational activity. The test
does not assure that the judge and jury will appreciate how the
untaken precaution proposed by the injured patron would impair
the recreational value of the activity for patrons generally. To its
credit, the test allows the vendor's counsel to argue that a precaution should not be deemed cost-justified once its negative impact
on the recreational value of the vendor's activity to other patrons
is weighed in the calculus. But the utilitarian atmospherics of the
Learned Hand test and the absence of any jury instruction on the
matter invite the jury to ignore this disadvantage of the proposed
precaution. When an injured patron claims a rock-climbing vendor should have interfered with the bluff to which it offers access
in order to reduce the risk of the climb, can a jury be relied upon
to appreciate all the ways in which the proposed interference will
diminish the fun, thrill, and challenge of the bluff to other rockclimbers? Will juries even appreciate the role that the risk of injury plays in rock climbing? Those studying rock climbing emphasize that rock climbers, like the patrons of the other recreational
activities in question, generally do not pursue risk for its own
sake.6 3 Rather risk is accepted and utilized as a part of the gestalt
of climbing in which feelings of control and competence predominate. Yet as one commentator points out in regard to rock climbing, "the outsider systematically misestimates the role played by
the 'irrational' counters of the activity [such as risk], either by
mistaking them for an end rather than a means or by assuming
the player's obsession with them."6 4 Under the current law, the
recreational benefits of rejecting the patron's proposed precaution

62. Given the weakness of the modern meaning of negligence and the ease with which
patrons can advance a theory of negligence, the patron's release could well be interpreted
as a promise from the patron that if injured, he will refrain from second-guessing the vendor's behavior with some negligence theory.
63. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, BEYOND BOREDOM AND ANXIETY 82 (1975) [hereinafter BOREDOM].

64. Id.
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may not even receive the complement of repudiation. More likely,
they will simply be ignored.65
The Learned Hand test also hurts the avid sportsman because
it fails to focus the jury's attention on the possibility that the injured patron might easily have avoided his injury merely by delaying his participation in the activity until he was better prepared for it. The failure of the negligence test to create an
incentive for the plaintiff to avoid injury by lowering his activity
level is well-known.6 6 In light of the disproportionately high proportion of injured patrons who are novices, the patron's nonparticipation may often be the cheapest precaution. Finally, the
Learned Hand test assumes risk neutrality and will therefore induce vendors to take precautions that are excessive for patrons
who like dealing with risk.6 7
Whatever the reason for the evolution of the meaning of negligence from the failure to take the care of a reasonable person to
the failure to change one's behavior in any manner deemed costjustified, that is not the only change in the meaning of negligence
which has reduced the vendor's chance of winning a directed verdict. The historic meaning of negligence, which an occasional
court will still cite with approval, was failure to take the care that
was necessary and proper to prevent injuries to reasonably careful
persons. As Judge Posner has written:
A person cannot be deemed negligent for failing to take precautions
against an accident that potential victims could avoid by the exercise
of elementary care; negligence is failing to take the care necessary
and proper to prevent injury to reasonably careful persons. Correlatively, there is no duty to warn against an obvious danger, for an obvious danger is no danger to a reasonably careful person.

65. Professor Gerla has reviewed the psychological literature suggesting that juries
will ignore many disadvantages of a plaintiffs proposed precaution. Harry S. Gerla, The
"Reasonableness"Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their
Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 205-14 (1990).
66. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 141.
67. Id. at 140. One must distinguish a preference for dealing with risks the actor can
influence from a general preference for risk. A person with a general preference for the
risk of death or serious injury would enjoy travel on a commercial airline partly because of
the risk of a crash. This article does not call for a consideration of such a preference. See
also infra note 342.
68. Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see
also Shipp v. Johnson, 452 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 1969) (holding that there is a duty to
warn only of hidden, not obvious, perils); Burdeaux v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 So.
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The goals driving this historic meaning of negligence are to lead
the plaintiff to undertake reasonable efforts to learn about an activity's risks and to avoid the proof problems that would be encountered if the fact finder needed to determine whether a particular plaintiff actually undertook those efforts.6 9
Rather than follow this historic meaning of negligence, many
modern courts have broadened the concept of negligence to include any failure to take a precaution that would be cost-justified
if vendors assumed foreseeable misbehavior by the patron.7 ° This
broadened concept of negligence allows juries to deem vendors
negligent for failing to take precautions that would only be costjustified if one assumes patrons will behave as unreasonably as
fools, drunks, or those rendered ill or unconscious in the midst of
the activity. Thus, tort law instructs vendors to sanitize their activities until they are safe for use by the foolish or the drunk; that
is, until their activities are foolproof and drunk proof.
The toll which this broadened concept of negligence takes on
recreational activities is rarely appreciated. Foolproofing and
drunk proofing a recreational activity will often suck the life from
the activity or eliminate it altogether. The treatment accorded hotels offering a pool and diving board that satisfied or exceeded the
safety standards of the National Spa and Pool Institute ("NSPI")
provides an example.7 1 Under the historic concept of negligence-

728, 731 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (finding no "legal duty to prevent careless persons from hurting themselves"); S. Md. Elec. Coop. v. Blanchard, 212 A.2d 301, 304 (Md. 1965) (holding
that the defendant was not liable for failing to insulate wire, in plain view, which electrocuted plaintiff); Velte v. Nichols, 127 A.2d 544, 546 (Md. 1956) (finding that the defendant
was not obligated to ensure safe footing of ladder which plaintiff did not check before using); Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co., 37 A.2d 263, 266 (Md. 1944) (holding that the
defendant was not negligent where plaintiff fell out of a large, conspicuous window); Hunnewell v. Haskell, 55 N.E. 320, 320 (Mass. 1899) (stating that there is "no duty.. . to give
warning of the presence of an ordinary flight of stairs in broad daylight").
69. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 73-85 (1987).
70. E.g., Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1167 (Fla. 1979) ("[Tlhe
obviousness of the hazard is not an exception to liability on the part of the manufacturer."); In re Martin, 559 N.E. 2d 1125, 1129 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that electrocution was reasonably foreseeable because "the condition and circumstances reasonably
indicate that people might come into contact with the transmission lines"); Holm v. Sponco
Mfg., Inc. 324 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn. 1982) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant which had been granted on the basis that the danger was obvious); Ayers v. Johnson
& Johnson Baby Prods. Co, 797 P.2d 527, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a jury
verdict for the plaintiff where a child inhaled baby oil and the mother did nothing because
there was no warning on the bottle).
71. E.g., Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A-2d 1241 (N.J. 1990) (finding a pool manufacturer negligent for following NSPI safety standards).
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failure to take care to prevent injury to a reasonably careful person-such a hotel faced little or no tort exposure for the terrible
injuries when patron-divers contacted the bottom of the pool with
great force. This was because in a pool meeting NSPI standards,
a diver who exercised the minimal care against smashing his
head on the bottom needed to steer up after hitting the water's
surface thereby eliminating his risk of injury from contacting the
bottom. Because minimal care by patrons made a pool and diving
board complying with NSPI standards reasonably safe, the hotel
could not be deemed negligent for offering such a pool and diving
board. Accordingly, no court needed to consider the plaintiffs
claims that yet further precautions, well beyond what the NSPI
required, such as further increasing the pool's depth or throw
area or further decreasing its slope rise, were cost-justified. But
once the concept of negligence required all precautions that would
be cost-justified if one assumed foreseeable misbehavior by the
patron, the sportsmen's hope of finding diving boards at such
pools was doomed. For the foolish, drunken, or unconscious diver
who, say, relied entirely on the water to slow his descent or who
continued his dive underwater into the shallow part of the pool,
neither the NSPI standards nor any other practical alternative
design would be reasonably safe. To save divers who rely entirely
on the water to slow their descent from spinal injuries, for example, a pool with a standard one-meter diving board would need to
be about twenty-two feet deep rather than the standard nine or
ten feet.72 The head-on collision between the wish to encourage
precautions the foolish, drunken, and unconscious need, and the
wish to preserve recreational activities the minimally careful desire, should be clear. Not surprisingly, then, judicial decisions
that allow liability to turn on the precautions needed to protect
the foolish and the drunken ignore the wishes of the minimally
careful sportsman entirely. Indeed this utter disregard of the
wishes of the minimally careful sportsmen is a conspicuous feature of the opinions upholding jury awards against vendors who
offer pools that comply with NSPI safety standards,7 3 as well as of
a recent opinion upholding an award against the NSPI itself.74 At
72. Nat'l Spa and Pool Inst. Consumer Awareness Bulletin (October 1982) (on file
with author); see also Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
73. E.g., Ryan, 579 A.2d at 1252.
74. Meneely, 5 P.3d at 57 (upholding a judgment of $11 million against the NSPI for
their negligence in suggesting minimum safety standards for Type II pools which fail to
protect a diver who relies on the water to slow him down).
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no point in these opinions do the courts acknowledge that the pool
and diving board were reasonably safe for the minimally careful
diver nor appreciate the consequences for the minimally careful
diver of requiring the precautions deemed cost-justified for the
foolish or drunken." Rather the courts seem to suggest that the
injured patron has produced sufficient evidence of negligence
merely by having his expert testify that, in light of the design of
defendant's pool and board and the wide variety of dangerous behavior past divers have engaged in, a diver can strike the bottom
forcefully.7 6 Under such a test, any vendor offering any activities
that the patron can perform in a dangerous way may be found
negligent for that reason alone.
As John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty, a free society will
target those who abuse a freedom and not shut down for all an
entire domain of freedom simply to deal with the minority who
cannot be trusted with it. 77 Yet imposing tort liability on vendors
who neglect a precaution worthwhile only for the foolish or unusually impaired patron shuts down an entire domain of freedom
when it leads to the activities' disappearance.
Granted, this modern and broader meaning of negligence may
be appropriate for settings other than recreational activities. In
the industrial accident setting, a major concern driving product
liability law is the wish to pressure manufacturers to adopt costjustified design changes that will anticipate momentary inadvertence by the workers expected to use the product. The momentary
inadvertence of a worker using a drill press is-however culpable-virtually inevitable over the useful life of the press. This is
just another way of saying that the cost of the worker staying
vigilant over the life of the press is probably greater than the cost
of almost any engineering solution the manufacturer may devise.
Hence the better precaution, and the precaution the law seeks to
encourage through liability, is for the drill press designer to engineer safety features that render the press proof against such inadvertence.7" These engineered safety measures may increase the

75. See, e.g., Ryan, 579 A.2d at 1252; Meneely, 5 P.3d at 57.
76. See Meneely, 5 P.3d at 52, 57 (examining expert testimony and holding that the
NSPI failed to exercise its duty to protect divers).
77. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 96 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978).
78. Perhaps the most widely used expression of this preference for engineering solutions over behavioral solutions comes from the traffic accident context: "'Which is easier,' .... 'to convince 195 million drivers to habitually refrain from panic application of the
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initial costs and maintenance costs of the press; moreover, those
safety measures may decrease the durability and ease of use of
the press. Still, the decision whether the safety measure is costjustified may comfortably turn on the usual comparison in negligence cases of the measure's safety payoff to the workers versus
all the measure's costs. In other words, the workers' risks of injury in this business context are not an inseparable part of the
workers' benefit from their work. The social value of allowing the
user of a drill press to deal with the risks from his inadvertence is
not so keen that it needs to disturb the usual straightforward calculus of negligence law.79 In contrast, many injury risks to a patron from recreational activities are indeed an inseparable and often desirable part of the patron's benefit from the activity. One
can applaud the modern meaning of negligence that requires all
cost-justified precautions to render a drill press proof against
momentary inadvertence without applying an analogous principle
to the vendor's recreational activities.
The abandonment of the notion that negligence means the failure to take the care appropriate to prevent injury to reasonably
careful persons appears more clearly when one considers that this
notion would require those evaluating a party's conduct to determine (if only implicitly) what behavior the ordinary care standard
demands of the other parties. Under the historic meaning, the
level of ordinary care for one party will depend on the other parties' costs of, and possibilities for, reducing risk. Indeed were the
previous meaning followed, a jury instruction reminding the jury
of their need to determine how the other parties would behave if
they behaved with reasonable care would be appropriate in almost every case. I say almost every case because in some casesfor instance, in some car accidents where the standard of ordinary care is set by the rules of the road and few exceptions allowed--one can determine what ordinary care would require regardless of the care taken by the other parties. A party who
drives at night without turning his lights on can be deemed negligent without determining how ordinary care would require

brake in emergencies or to design an anti-locking braking system in the vehicle?'" JERRY L.
MASHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 65 (1990) (quoting a witness who testified in favor of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966).
79. The same philosophy drives the notion that cars should be made crash-proof.
Again, there is little social value in allowing car occupants to deal with the risk of injury
from car collisions.
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other drivers to behave."0 Those cases aside, however, the fact
that no such instruction is ever given and that juries are never
told the previous meaning nor ever invited as part of their
evaluation of the defendant's negligence to consider how other
parties ought to behave shows that the previous meaning is ignored. If juries evaluating whether a vendor's conduct is negligent consider the ability of the patron to take care and how his
taking care would have affected the behavior expected of the vendor, they do so on their own.
The well-known move by most states to comparative negligence
has further reduced the vendor's chance of winning on directed
verdict. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk, previously complete defenses, are now subsumed in most states' comparative negligence scheme.8" That scheme encourages, and some
states require, trial courts to let the plaintiff reach the jury despite obvious or outrageous negligence on the part of the plaintiff
and no matter how willingly the plaintiff encountered an activity's risks.8 2 In the move to comparative negligence, furthermore,
several states have eliminated assumption of risk as a defense by
finding that it adds nothing to the contributory negligence defense."3 As a result, contributory negligence has become the only
80. E.g., Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that operating a
car with only one headlight is negligence per se under Alabama law).
81. See, e.g., Liv. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975).
82. Professor James Henderson has referred to the reduction in the judicial role and
the tendency to leave all cases to the jury as the "expansion and purification of the negligence concept." James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom

the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 477 (1976). This expansion of the negligence concept increases the percentage of cases in which juries are in a position to render discretionary
judgments.
83. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 68 (Alaska 1968) ("As a matter of policy
we disapprove of a concept which could result in a situation where an accident victim,
even though not contributorily at fault, could be barred from recovery because he knew or
should have known of a negligently created risk."); McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196
A.2d 238, 240-41 (N.J. 1963) (refusing to recognize the doctrine of assumption of risk);
Rutter v. N.E. Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1208-09 (Pa. 1981) (abolishing
the doctrine of assumption of risk). The erosion of the assumption of risk doctrine has been
described elsewhere. See Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law
of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 215-16 (1987). The assumption

of risk doctrine as it existed before 1965 allowed the risk-preferring and risk-averse to sort
themselves to activities of different dangerousness. It was this benefit of the doctrine that
Judge Cardozo referred to when he ruled for the vendor in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Park with the famous words "[tihe timorous may stay at home." 250 N.Y. 479, 483
(N.Y. 1929). With the demise of the assumption of risk doctrine, enforcing releases may be
the best method of providing this benefit. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAW 176 (6thed. 2003).
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claim based on a plaintiffs behavior that modern law considers.
And, of course, even establishing a plaintiffs contributory negligence, in many jurisdictions,
will merely reduce the defendant's
84
liability, not eliminate it.
Eliminating assumption of risk as a defense separate from contributory negligence often renders irrelevant a plaintiffs willingness or desire to encounter the risks that materialized. And disregarding a plaintiffs attitude toward those risks yields perverse
results. Consider the plaintiff passenger who intentionally takes
a pistol from the glove compartment of a defendant's car and
shoots himself in a suicide attempt. When the plaintiff or his
heirs sue the defendant for his negligent placement of his pistola straightforward claim that has often prevailed 8 -the fact that
the plaintiff intentionally took the pistol and shot himself in a
suicide attempt may not be relevant in plaintiffs suit at all. 6
Logically a plaintiffs suicide attempt may not bear on any element in his prima facie claim for unreasonably dangerous placement of the pistol, having no bearing on the elements of breach or
cause-in-fact or proximate cause, at least when that latter element has been reduced to the foreseeability of the negligently
placed pistol aiding a suicide attempt. Any relevance then must
come from its tendency to show that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In some jurisdictions, however, intentional misconduct-like the plaintiffs attempt to commit suicide-is never
viewed as negligence, because intentional and negligent misconduct are viewed as mutually exclusive categories.8 One anomaly
is that the plaintiff who attempted suicide would have a better
chance of recovery than a plaintiff who unintentionally but negli-

84. In many states, plaintiffs contributory negligence will only eliminate liability
when it exceeds the negligence of each defendant. Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1298
(8th Cir. 1975) (applying a Minnesota statute and holding that recovery is precluded if the
plaintiffs contributory negligence exceeds the defendant's negligence). In some states contributory negligence does not eliminate liability even then. See, e.g., Wong v. Hawaiian
Scenic Tours, Ltd., 642 P.2d 930, 931-32 (Haw. 1982) (allowing recovery against a defendant only six percent responsible when plaintiff was fourteen percent responsible).
85. E.g., Stewart v. Wulf, 271 N.W.2d 79 (Wis. 1978) (upholding judgment in favor of
the plaintiff who found a gun on a bed in the defendant's house and accidentally shot himself).
86. See id.
87. E.g., Harvey v. Mid-Coast Hosp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Me. 1999) (ruling that a
hospital could not assert contributory negligence as a defense to a claim for improper
treatment of an attempted suicide victim).
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gently shot himself, because the contributory negligence of the
unintentional shooter would plainly be held against him."8
Granted, some courts would have no problem-and there is certainly no conceptual problem-finding that attempting suicide
creates an unreasonable risk of injury to oneself and hence is
clearly contributory negligence. Not attempting suicide surely
qualifies as a cost-justified precaution that plaintiff neglected to
take. But there are limits to the amount of baggage the contributory negligence concept can be made to carry. The plaintiffs intentional misconduct will not always create an unreasonable risk
of injury to himself. The armed robber of a flower shop-that is
too isolated for police patrols and that is clearly unoccupied save
for the infirm proprietor known to be defenseless-may reasonably believe he can walk in the open door during business hours
and rob the shop without creating an unreasonable risk of injury
to himself. How then can his robbery be viewed as contributory
negligence? But if his robbery does not bear on his contributory
negligence, on what element will it bear should the robber, after
slipping on the steps of the flower shop, sue the proprietor for
negligent maintenance of the steps? With the assumption of risk
defense eliminated and proximate cause reduced to foreseeability,
the answer is none. That the robber's injury arose while he was in
the process of robbing the defendant proprietor has become entirely irrelevant to his tort action." In order to render the robbery
relevant, some defense separate from the contributory negligence
defense is needed.
The most common illustrations of the consequences of allowing
a defendant to attack a plaintiffs conduct only on the ground of
contributory negligence come from the famous premises liability
cases which abolished the old distinctions between trespassers,
licensees, and invitees9 0 By imposing on land occupiers a duty of

88. Compare Harvey, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 38 with Wulf, 271 N.W.2d at 85 (finding that a
gunshot victim was contributorily negligent).
89. See Harvey, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
90. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968), is the most well-known case
abolishing the former classifications of trespassers, licensees and invitees. For cases allowing trespassers to recover, see Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,358 U.S.
625, 630-31 (1959); Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489
P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1971); Pickardv. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (Haw.
1969); Cates v. BeauregardElec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 352
N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976). In response to negligence actions by criminal trespassers to
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ordinary care to all who come on the land, the courts limit land
occupiers to two arguments: either no negligence on their own
part or contributory negligence on the injured's part. Under that
rule, burglars injured during their burglary by their victim's negligent maintenance of his stairway, roof, or hot tub have successfully sued their victim.9' Consider the logical implications of a
duty of ordinary care to trespassers should night time bank robbers sue their target bank for back injuries suffered while hauling
away bags of coins during their robbery. Given that banks can
surely foresee night time bank robbers breaking into their bank
and its safe-and the foreseeability is shown by the bank's precautions against such a crime-and can also foresee the robbers
swiftly carrying off the coins and injuring their backs in the process, and given the modest cost of keeping a dolly near the safe,
shouldn't a jury be allowed to find a bank which failed to keep a
dolly near the safe causally negligent? Devoting negligence lawsuits to the single-minded goal of encouraging all cost-justified
safety precautions leads to such results. That single-minded goal
drives negligence suits toward inevitable collisions with many
other values and goals, not just those of the avid sportsman.
Holding the banks liable to the injured robbers, for instance, offends the principle that no one should profit by his own wrong
and undermines the deterrence goals of the criminal law.
Many of the courts that still retain assumption of risk have so
raised the requirements for establishing that defense as to sap it
of any value to vendors. For instance, courts have increased the
amount of knowledge about the risk which a plaintiff must possess in order for the defense to apply.9 2 A few courts have gone so
far as to confine the defense to those rare instances where plaintiff knew that the risk would materialize and knew that he would
probably be injured as a result.9 Yet such an interpretation of asrecover for their injuries against the victims of their trespasses, the California legislature
passed Civil Code section 847 in 1985 which bars these negligence actions.
91. See Kathleen Day, Consumers Feel Pinch: Insurance for Liability Skyrockets, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1985, at 1 ("[A] burglar who fell through a skylight and was paralyzed
while trying to break into a high school, recovered $260,000 in an out-of-court settlement
plus $1,200 a month for 20 years. He argued that the school should have warned that the
skylight was unsafe.").
92. See, e.g., Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant despite the plaintiffs prior
knowledge that the stair upon which she slipped and fell was damaged).
93. See, e.g., Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So. 2d 435, 438-39 (La. 1980) (holding that the
assumption of risk defense requires that the plaintiff voluntarily participate with full
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sumption of risk is wholly inconsistent with the defense to which
assumption of risk has always been anaiogous, namely, the consent privilege to intentional torts. Because the consent privilege
affords a complete defense to an intentional tort, traditionally a
more culpable wrong than mere negligence, logically it should be
harder to establish than assumption of risk. That is, the defendant asserting a consent defense should need to show that the
plaintiff has more knowledge about the chance of injury than if
the defendant were merely asserting an assumption of risk defense. But the common law defense of consent can be shown even
though the plaintiff knows nothing of the likely injury from the
defendant's invasion. To consent to battery, for example, the
plaintiff need not know that the defendant's behavior would injure him but only that the defendant's behavior would cause him
contact. 94 In other words, the plaintiffs knowledge that the defendant's tortious behavior exposes him to the risk of injury,
rather than the certainty of injury, may suffice to relieve an intentional tortfeasor from liability.9" Confining assumption of risk
to cases where plaintiffs know they likely will be injured treats
negligent tortfeasor more harshly than the intentional
the merely
6
one.

9

Less well-known doctrinal changes have likewise reduced the
vendor's ability to win a directed verdict by pointing to the patron's negligence. The willingness of courts to narrow the circumstances in which the patron's negligence will be imputed to the
plaintiff has hurt vendors considerably. In wrongful death actions
brought by the patron's relatives for the patron's death, the patron's negligence, however clear or flagrant, simply may not
count. In a California Supreme Court case, Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,9 7 the wife and mother of a father and son who drowned while
using the defendant's hotel pool in the early morning hours
brought a wrongful death action for negligence. 9 There were no
witnesses to the drowning.9 9 The father and son were alone in the

knowledge that serious injuries could result).
94.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 893B (1963).

95. See id.
96. See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1127-28 (La. 1988) (comparing
contributory negligence to assumption of risk).
97. 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970).
98. Id. at 466.
99. Id. at 467.
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pool area throughout their use of the pool, circumstances strongly
suggesting that at least one of them was contributorily negligent.100 Justice Tobriner, however, thought their behavior should
not bar recovery by the wife and mother: "When the negligent
spouse dies in the accident and thus will in no way benefit from
any recovery received.., no logical basis can support the application of the 'imputed contributory negligence' rule to a wrongful
death action maintained by the surviving non-negligent
spouse."' 1 In short, as long as the plaintiff spouse and mother is
innocent, and the defendant vendor causally negligent, the vendor is fully liable." 2 That the vendor's negligence-the hotel's
failure to post a sign indicating that no lifeguard was on dutypaled in comparison to the likely contributory negligence of the
father and son became an irrelevant detail.'0 3 Throughout his
opinion, Justice Tobriner demonstrates his indifference to the effect of his ruling on the number of hotels with pools and hence on
those who enjoy hotel pools. In a footnote he suggests, amazingly,
that while liability will raise the price of hotels with pools, it
would not influence a hotel's decision to offer a pool. 10 4
The vendor's difficulty in winning on directed verdict under the
current law naturally becomes more expensive as the chance of
losing with the jury and the average amount of damages awarded
increases. While no statistics are available specifically for recreational activity cases, both the percent of plaintiff jury victories in
all tort cases and the average inflation-adjusted award in all tort
cases have increased in the modern era. 0 5
Several state legislatures and other state and private organizations have reacted against the judicial willingness to let injured
patrons sue vendors for negligence. 1' 6 While the resulting statutes

100. Id.
101. Id. at 474 n.15 (quotation marks added by court for emphasis).

102. Id.
103. Id. at 473-74.
104. Id. at 477 n.20.
105. Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION 72-73 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (indicating that damage
awards are increasing rapidly in the United States).
106. See Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act-An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249, 252 (1998)
(commenting that many state legislatures have come to the aid of recreational vendors);
see also Dave Dorr, Officials PrepareProposalRequests for St. Charles Skateboard Park;
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differ in form, they all seek to prevent a common law negligence
action against the vendor from proceeding in the usual fashion.
Like other tort reform statutes which share this goal, they receive
such harsh treatment from courts that no vendor or liability insurer can rely on the statutes' plain meaning being enforced. 0 7
Statutes designed to protect the vendor from suit when the patron's injuries arose from the "inherent risks" of the activity have
been vitiated on the ground that they do not apply whenever the
"inherent risks" were not the sole cause-in-fact of the patron's injuries.10 8 In particular, they do not apply when a cause-in-fact was
the vendor's negligence. Of course, absent that cause-in-fact connection to the patron's injuries, no vendor would be liable for his
negligence in the first place. Hence this interpretation eliminates
any effect of the statute on the common law negligence action.
Other statutes have attempted to control the common law action by carefully limiting the duties of the vendor. A Colorado ski
statute, for example, indicates the specific duties which ski areas
owe to skiers in a clear attempt to limit the ski areas' duties. 0 9
The federal courts, however, have interpreted the statute not as
limiting the ski areas' common law liability but as adding to that
liability."0 So while the statute obliges a ski area to mark manmade obstacles and conspicuously refrains from imposing any
duty to mark natural obstacles, the Tenth Circuit, following Colorado law, found the statute too irrelevant to mention in a successful negligence action for the ski area's failure to mark a natural

Complex Will Be Open Next Summer, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL 3558436 (quoting city park and maintenance supervisors' efforts to limit
liability); Steve O'Neill, SCHOOL VIOLENCE ALERT, Apr. 7, 2000 (listing some practical

steps that can be taken to reduce school liability for playground accidents).
107. For the marked hostility of courts to tort reform efforts, see Pizza v. Wolf Creek
Ski Dev. Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 684 (Colo. 1985) (destroying the value to vendors of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of 1979); Sofie v. FibreboardCorp., 771 P.2d 711, 719-27 (Wash. 1989)
(rejecting the statutory cap on pain and suffering damages); Marco de Sa e Silva, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Washington's Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases
of PersonalInjury and Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653, 675 (1988) (showing that most statutes limiting damages have been held unconstitutional).
108. Ninio v. High% 385 F.2d 350, 352 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Bouchard v. Johnson,
555 N.W.2d 81, 85 (N.D. 1996). A statute banning liability when a patron's injury arose
from an activity's inherent risks was also vitiated on other grounds in Graven v. Vail Assocs., 909 P.2d 514, 520 (Colo. 1995).
109. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-106, -107, -108 (2002).
110. Rimkus v. N.W. Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1067 (10th Cir. 1983).
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obstacle.11 1 Recreational use statutes aim to encourage landowners to open their land to the public for recreational purposes by
protecting landowners from common law negligence actions for
injuries suffered by the land users." 2 But again, the judicial determination to defend the common law negligence action against
the legislature has nullified the value of those statutes to recreational vendors. 1 13 Despite statutory language protecting the landowner against negligence suits by any member of the public entering the landowner's property, courts have construed the
recreational use statutes as not applying when the landowner is
sued for negligence by a person who was invited onto the property." 4 Under this construction, the statutes bar suits from those
on the land merely by permission while allowing suits from those
on the land by invitation, a distinction fatal for the recreational
vendor." 5 That the statute is in derogation of the common law
has constituted the only ground for such an unfriendly construction." 6 The judicial treatment of these statutes suggests that the
liability of vendors for their negligence will not be significantly
reduced until courts are convinced of the wisdom of doing so. Proposed legislation, however carefully and thoughtfully drafted, will
not suffice." 7
This review of the obstacles recreational vendors face in keeping a case against them from the jury suggests the substantial
reduction in the vendor's liability from enforcing releases early

111. Id.
112. See LePoidevin v. Wilson, 330 N.W.2d 555, 562-63 (Wis. 1983).
113. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressed bewilderment about the legislature's
goal in passing the Wisconsin Recreational Use Act. WIS. STAT. § 895.52 (2000). "We continue to be frustrated in our efforts to state a test that can be applied easily because of the
seeming lack of basic underlying principles in the statute." Auman v. Sch. Dist. of StanleyBoyd, 635 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Wis. 2001); see also Minn. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse, 627 N.W.2d 527, 532-33 (Wis. 2001) (finding that boys injured while at
play were not engaged in a recreational activity within the meaning of the Act). The court
seems to have ignored the simple goal of increasing outdoor recreation by increasing the
amount of land available for that recreation.
114. LePoidevin, 330 N.W.2d at 563.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 562.
117. Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. has ably drafted and defended legislation designed
to reduce the landowner's liability significantly and thereby achieve the goals of recreational use statutes. As desirable as this legislation would be, courts who are not persuaded
of its merits are likely to prevent it from achieving its goals or significantly benefiting
sportsmen. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities-The Alternative to "Nerf®," Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 747-58 (1992).
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and routinely. But to ensure that reduction in the vendor's liability expense, courts must also clarify some ancillary matters not
yet discussed. First, courts need to clarify that releases are to be
accorded a reasonable scope. For example, the release of a horseriding stable should apply not just when the patron is riding, but
also during the selection of horses and the mounting, dismounting, and walking away from the horses. The release need not apply when the patron is injured by a negligently maintained stairway leading from the parking lot into the stable's waiting room.
In general, the release should apply as long as the vendor's negligence is reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the
release was given. Second, the enforcement of the release must
not succumb to the court's approach in Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,1 '
but must bar claims for negligence that are derivative to the patron's claim." 9 These include claims by relatives or friends of the
patron for wrongful death or loss of consortium. These would also
include claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress from,
for example, witnessing or learning of the patron's injury. Likewise, indemnity or contribution claims against the vendor from
others found liable for the patron's injury should be barred. 20 Finally, and most significantly, courts must clarify that a release
given by a parent or guardian for a minor patron is no less enforceable than a release signed by an adult patron for himself.'2 '
The authority which the law accords parents to decide a spectrum
of fundamental matters affecting their child calls for according
them the authority to waive the child's right to the enervating
and indefinite prospect of a tort claim for negligence.' 2 2

118. 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970).
119. Id. at 474 (holding that the patron's negligence cannot be imputed to a spouse in a
wrongful death action).
120. Cases presenting such attempts at indemnity or contribution include Rose v. Fox
Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906, 907 (Md. 1993) and Noll v. HarrisburgArea YMCA, 643 A-2d 81

(Pa. 1994).
121. Professor King has argued convincingly that a release granted by a minor patron's
parent should be enforced to bar the minor patron's action against the vendor. King, supra
note 117, at 713-20.
122. Some courts agree with Professor King. See, e.g., Sharon v. City of Newton, 769
N.E.2d 738, 742-48 (Mass. 2002) (upholding parental release when a girl was injured during cheerleading practice at a public school). But see Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062,
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B. The Effects of the CurrentLaw
"And what is it to say goodbye to the swift pony and the hunt?
The end of living and the beginning of survival."
ChiefSeattle
The previous section pointed out the features of the current law
that reduce the vendor's ability to keep a negligence claim by an
injured patron from the jury. Subjecting vendors to a jury's discretion means considerable uncertainty about which precautions
vendors need to take to avoid being deemed negligent. That the
negligence test calls for the application of the general standard of
reasonable care rather than any specific rule further increases
the unpredictability and uncertainty of a jury's verdict. 12 3 This
uncertain application of the negligence test, Professor Schwartz
1 24
has argued, is another major shortcoming of the tort system.
While one might think this uncertain application would have a
neutral effect on precaution-taking by encouraging some vendors
to gamble by taking too few precautions and others to play it safe
by taking too many, in fact, uncertain application leads vendors
systematically to take too many precautions. 1 25 Liability insurers
soon discover that the cost to them of the vendor erroneously being found negligent outweighs any benefit from allowing vendors
to forego precautions which are not cost-justified. Predictably,
those insurers will pressure their vendors to take precautions
which are not cost justified if, for any reason, taking the precaution decreases the chance of an erroneous assessment of negligence. 26 This excess precaution-taking may well entail the elimination of the activities the avid sportsman loves.
1063-68 (Utah 2001) (invalidating parental release when an eleven-year-old fell from a
horse at the defendant's stable).
123. See, e.g., Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Neb. 1996) ("[Albandoning
the established system in favor of a standard of reasonable care would decrease predictability.. . ."); Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 446 (W. Va. 1999) ("'Adoptions of a true
negligence standard eliminates the complex, confusing, and unpredictable state of premises-liability law ... ' (quoting Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C. 1998)).
124. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 345 (1990).
125. Id. at 354-58; see also SHAVELL, supra note 68, at 82-83 (stating that uncertainty
encourages precaution taking, even if it is socially undesirable). See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (discussing whether uncertainty gives parties an incentive to
take too many or too few precautions).
126. See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 356-57.
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Of course one desired effect of vendor liability for negligence is
less vendor negligence. And, in theory, this deterrent should be
achieved even when the vendors' liability insurers cover the full
amount of the vendor liability. This is because those liability insurers should punish vendors found causally negligent by charging them higher premiums, thereby bringing home to the vendors
the cost of their negligence and deterring them from future negligence.' 27 Partly because such carefully refined pricing of liability
risks is rare, considerable uncertainty exists about whether the
current liability system actually deters negligence. Review of the
ample literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this article. 2 " But almost all commentators agree that the case for liability rests on its beneficial deterrence because the other justification for liability-compensation--can be far better achieved
methods such as the patron's accident and
through first party
129
health insurance.
While we may not know the effect of expanded liability on vendor care, we do know that vendor behavior changed in one respect
during the period in which liability expanded: Vendors stopped
offering the activities the avid sportsmen love. So two pertinent
questions are whether expanded liability was responsible for the
elimination of those activities, and if so, whether, from a welfare

127. Even accurately priced liability insurance reduces the deterrent effect of liability
insofar as it lowers the cost of that liability to the insured by economizing on the insured's
reserve process. In other words, without liability insurance the fear of liability should lead
the insured to estimate and set aside a reserve-a stockpile of liquid assets-in order to
cover potential losses. Liability insurance may economize on the cost of estimating and
maintaining that reserve because, in effect, it substitutes the insurance premium for those
costs. In addition, accurately priced liability insurance reduces the deterrent effect of the
risk of liability on risk averse insureds to the extent that the insurance renders those insureds more risk neutral. Despite these reductions, the deterrent effect of liability under
accurately priced liability insurance may still be optimal.
128. After examining what he calls "the uneasy case for the deterrent effect of tort liability," Professor Rabin concludes:
In sum, there are any number of reasons to be less than sanguine about the
deterrent effect of tort liability. In some instances . .. they are systematically
unobserved. Even when tort rules are clearly communicated, they may add
little to other non-legal constraints on dangerous conduct. And even if they
deter, it may be that they promote too much or too little caution.
ROBERT L. RABIN, Deterrence and the Tort System, in SANCTIONS AND REWARDS IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 85-86 (M.L. Friedland ed., 1989); see also A. Russell Localio et al., Relation
Between MalpracticeClaims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard
Medical PracticeStudy III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 250 (1991); Michelle M. Mello &
Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice
Reform, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1595, 1607-13 (2002).
129. E.g., RABIN, supra note 128, at 94; SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 5-32.
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perspective, the elimination of those activities was socially desirable (i.e., whether it increased or decreased social welfare).
Skeptics may question whether the increased vendor liability
since the 1960s-both real and perceived-is the primary reason
that vendors no longer offer the activities that avid sportsmen
love. The disappearance or at least reduced availability of these
activities may be due to other factors such as changes in consumer tastes or the emergence of new alternative activities. After
all, the Coase Theorem suggests that the risk of injury to the patron represents a cost of the activity that will be taken into account by the patron or his parents who appreciate that risk with
or without vendor liability.1 3 ° Cognizant of the injury risk to the
patron, the patron or his parents will implicitly add the cost of
that risk to the activity's price in deciding whether to purchase
the activity even when the patron has no hope of being compensated for his injuries. 3 ' Hence, although liability certainly raises
the vendor's costs of offering the activity and, ceteris paribus,
should reduce the supply of the activity, one cannot glibly maintain that liability raises the activity's full costs.'32 Insofar as the
patron's prospect of tort recovery from the vendor reduces the activity's injury costs in the patron's eyes dollar for dollar, that
prospect should increase patron demand for the activity. 1 33 That
increased demand by itself should lead to more of the activity in
society and should roughly offset the opposite effect from liability's tendency to reduce supply. 34 Indeed, if patrons valued the
vendor's liability more than the cost to the vendor of providing it,

130. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (proposing his theory that the allocation of resources will be the same regardless of whether the
business causing the harm is liable). In the absence of any prospect of the injured patron
recovering for his injuries, the patron's injury risk is expressed in reduced demand for the
activity. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. Of course the idea that liability does not affect the amount of the activity in
society assumes that on average juries will value the patron's injury costs in the same
amount as the patron would have valued them ex ante. Ifjuries generally award more for
an injury than the amount the patron would have paid ex ante to avoid that injury, liability is sure to drive off the market socially desirable activities. Whenever liability exceeds
the level of actual losses, the law pressures defendants to take socially inappropriate
measures to eliminate risk.
134. See id. The net effect of increased demand and reduced supply on the amount of
an activity in society depends on the elasticity of supply and demand. Nevertheless an increase in demand tends to offset the reduction in the amount of an activity caused by reduced supply.
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the vendor's increased liability should increase the activity's
availability.13 5 In that case, however, we would have expected the
vendor and the patron to have agreed beforehand that the vendor
would be liable for the patron's injuries.
A further implication of the Coase Theorem is that increasing
tort liability on a currently profitable activity will only drive the
activity off the market in a well-defined case, namely when the
new liability is so little valued by patrons and so costly to vendors
that unprofitably few patrons will buy the activity when its price
is increased by the added cost of the new liability.'3 6 In other
words, in order to render unprofitable an activity the vendor previously found profitable, the added liability must so substantially
raise the price and so modestly raise the patron's benefit that an
insufficient number of patrons still find the activity a desirable
purchase.'3 7 For example, parents and children may value the
camp experience for children enough to preserve the availability
of such camps when the camps are priced at the lower levels possible in the absence of any camp liability for negligence. Increasing the camp's liability for injuries to campers will naturally require the camp to raise its prices. If parents and children attach
little, if any, value to the camp's added liability, the increased
price of the camp may drive away so many parents that the camp
will no longer remain profitable. Only in such a case will increasing the liability of camps lead to their disappearance. To use the
terms of George Priest, if one thinks of the pre-liability price of
the activity as the price when the patron relies only on his first
party insurance to cover his injury costs, and the liability price as
the price when the patron is also required to buy, as part of the
activity, third party tort insurance, one could say the activity disappears when enough patrons were willing to buy the activity
with first party insurance but are not willing to buy the activity
when they must also buy the little valued and costly third party
insurance. 138 In a series of publications, Priest has explained why
rational patrons attach very little value to the vendor's increased

135. See id.
136. See George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 47-48 (1991) [hereinafter The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability].
137. See id.
138. See id.
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tort liability,139 why the vendor's liability insurance for an injury
risk14 ° is likely to be more expensive-often by several orders of
magnitude-than first party insurance for that injury risk, and
yet why vendors, especially small ones, would rather abandon activities than go without liability insurance however expensive it
4
may be.' '

If the increase in liability from the 1960s has caused the disappearance of these activities, supporters of liability could applaud
that result. They could posit that liability has rightly led to the
disappearance of activities because, by internalizing some injury
costs of the activity, liability has required the activities to be
priced at an amount closer to the social costs. 142 Their assumption
is that, without liability, patrons, or their parents when parents
buy the activities, underestimate the injury costs of the activity to
the patron and hence buy activities they would not buy if they
knew the activities' true injury costs. Without liability the patron's injury costs are not impounded into the vendor's costs and
the vendor's price can, and should, be relatively-and deceptively-low. However, when liability impounds the injury cost of
the activity into its price, yielding a higher price nearer the activity's social costs, many patrons realize that the activity's value to
them is less than that new, higher price and accordingly refuse to

139. Priest believes one reason the increased liability of the vendor is nearly worthless
to consumers is because that extra liability amounts to insurance for nonpecuniary losses
and consumers have little reason to value such insurance. See George L. Priest, Can Absolute ManufacturerLiability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 256-57, 262 (1992).
140. See George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 499-501
(1987); George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1552-60 (1987) [hereinafter The CurrentInsurance Crisis].
141. See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 141; Priest, The
Modern Expansion of Tort Liability, supra note 136.
142. To review a specific example of internalization, see RAYMOND L. YASSER, TORTS
AND SPORTS: LEGAL LIABILITY IN PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR ATHLETICS 78-82 (1985)
(discussing product liability as it applies to the football helmet). Yasser maintains, for instance, that if the injury costs of football were internalized, the sport would disappear and
"this would surely be a healthy development." See id. at 82. Yasser's view contrasts with
that of Justice Handler of the Supreme Court of New Jersey:
One might well conclude that something is terribly wrong with a society in
which the most commonly-accepted aspects of play-a traditional source of a
community's conviviality and cohesion-spurs litigation. The heightened
recklessness standard recognizes a commonsense distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports that
should occur freely on the playing fields and should not be second-guessed in
courtrooms.
Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994).
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buy."' The activity disappears only because too few patrons remain willing to buy it once its injury costs have been internalized
into its price.144 By making activities pay their way-i.e., assuring
that the activities can survive in the marketplace when consumers appreciate their full costs (which naturally includes their injury costs)-liability eliminates from the market socially undesirable activities. "Socially undesirable" used in this context refers
to activities the demand for which is insufficient for the activities
to be offered profitably when the activities are priced at their full
costs. 45 Accordingly, supporters of this happy explanation for an
activities' disappearance-which might be dubbed the internalization explanation-can insist that stables would still allow patrons to take horses on a trail unaccompanied and motels would
still offer pools with diving boards if those activities were socially
desirable. In other words, if enough patrons valued those activities more than the activities' full costs and, hence, were happy to
continue buying the activity even after vendors had passed on the
cost of their liability in the form of higher prices, then the activity
would have continued to be profitable and would have survived. 4' 6
That the vendors have not been able to pass on the cost of their
liability successfully and that the activities have thus disappeared in the face of increased liability only shows that the activities were not socially desirable to begin with. 4 7
Supporters of the internalization explanation may concede that
the disappearance of activities disadvantages sportsmen who
take pains to protect themselves or who resolve not to sue should
they be injured. Yet they can console the sportsmen by pointing
out that this disadvantage does not differ from the disadvantage
to any aficionados of any activity whose collective demand for the
activity is insufficient to warrant a vendor providing it. The
sportsmen should attribute the unavailability of the activities
they love not to increased liability, but to the lack of enough fellow sportsmen willing and able to pay the full costs of the activ-

143. See Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability, supra note 136, at 47-48.
144. See id.
145. A synonymous but perhaps more helpful test for the social desirability of an activity is whether the demand for the activity is sufficiently high and its actual injury costs
sufficiently low that, without liability but with patrons knowing the activity's risks, the
activity would be profitable.
146. See YASSER, supra note 142, at 82.
147. See id.
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ity. Were the demand from avid sportsmen robust enough compared to the full costs of the activities, vendors would continue to
offer the activity and would merely pass on the cost of their increased liability in the form of higher prices to patrons. 148 After
all, dangerous activities, such as driving a car, remain widely
available even though the possibility of a common law negligence
action against the driver means that the driver's liability expense, and hence his liability insurance premiums, will be costly.
This internalization explanation only becomes more compelling
when one realizes that under the current law vendors do not internalize the costs of all injuries caused by their activities, but
only the costs of those injuries caused by the vendor's negligence.
Complete internalization would require that the law treat vendors much more harshly by holding them strictly liable for all injuries engendered by their activity. Hence, the vendor still does
not bear the full cost of the activity and the market price of the
activities remains significantly less than the activity's full social
costs.
However cheerful, this internalization explanation for the activities' disappearance should not be embraced. First, the explanation assumes that the vendor's liability costs faithfully represent the patron's injury costs from the vendor's negligence. But
we know those liability costs include much more than simply the
expected damage awards from judges and juries for the patron's
injury. For one thing, they include the considerable costs to the
vendor's liability insurer of handling the vendor's defense.14 9 Even
putting aside defense expenses and other costs not included in
damage awards, one cannot assume that the damage awards
themselves faithfully represent the patron's accident costs from
the vendor's negligence. Judges and juries are not allowed to
award damages for certain injury costs and in effect are instructed to award damages in excess of other injury costs. 5 °

148. See supra text accompanying notes 128-41 for a discussion concerning patrons'
willingness to buy activities/products which include liability cost.
149. If, because of those overhead costs, the vendor's liability expense is double the expected damages the vendor will pay, and if we assume that those expected damages accurately measure plaintiffs actual injury costs, then the vendor's liability expense will be
double the actual injury costs.
150. Tort damages understate the actual losses from a plaintiffs injury because they
ignore, for example, the loss to siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, and other relatives
or friends due to the injury to the plaintiff. On the other hand, tort damages overstate actual losses from injuries because they ignore, for example, the taxes that a plaintiff would
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Moreover, the little value patrons seem to attach to the prospect
of vendor liability should raise doubts about whether that prospect represents anything so important in the patron's eyes as his
injury costs.' 1 So little do patrons seem to value vendor liability
that one is almost justified in viewing that liability as a tax on
the vendor's activity. In any event the pre-liability cost of the activity to the vendor may better approximate the activity's social
costs if the patron's estimate of his cost of injury comes closer to
his actual injury costs than does the cost of liability to the vendor.
As Coase reminds us, the patron will inevitably take into account
his estimate of his injury costs in deciding
whether to purchase
152
price.
pre-liability
its
at
the activity
Another difficulty with the internalization explanation lies in
its assumption that patrons, or their parents when the parents
are the ones deciding to buy the activity, generally underestimate
the activities' injury costs to the patron. But as Steven Shavell
has written, consumers are more likely to appreciate the injury
costs from recreational services than from higher technology services and products:
[Ciustomers' knowledge of the risks attending use of a wide class of
modern-day products (automobiles, drugs, power machines) is presumably limited in significant ways because of customers' quite
natural inability to understand how the products function. And customers' knowledge of the quality of most professional services (medical, legal, architectural) is supposedly similarly limited. By contrast,
customers' information about the risks of common items of fairly
simple design (hammers, bicycles, can openers) is probably good on
the whole, and the same is likely true of their knowledge of the risks
of many of the services1 53
that they purchase in ordinary life (barbering, sports instruction).

When patron knowledge of the risks is likely, internalization of
injury costs on the vendor through liability is not needed to guarantee that the activity can pay its way and has the disadvantage

have needed to pay on the amounts awarded for lost income and the benefits to plaintiff
from not having to work to earn those amounts.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 128-41 for a discussion regarding patron
valuation of vendor liability.
152. See Coase, supra note 130, at 6-8.
153. SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 54.
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of diluting the incentive of the patron to protect himself during
the activity." 4
Naturally this dilution of the patron's incentives to protect
himself argues most forcefully against internalizing the accident
costs of those activities in which patrons are actually able to take
precautions to protect themselves. Denying liability in such contexts encourages the patron to take, rather than disregard, such
precautions. One can think of the law denying liability as preserving the patron's natural wish to protect himself. Because the
proposed rule calls for enforcing releases only in contexts when
precautions for patron self-protection are available, internalization of the accident costs in these contexts is not socially desirable.' 55
The internalization explanation for an activity's disappearance,
namely that liability showed the activity to be too dangerous and
too low in demand to be socially desirable, should not be uncritically accepted in any event. There are simply too many other reasons why increased liability may lead vendors to abandon a socially desirable activity.15 To begin with, increased liability may
dry up liability insurance for certain activities, not because of the
activities' dangerousness, but because of particular features of
the market for liability insurance. The lack of liability insurance
for an activity will lead vendors who feel they must carry liability
insurance to abandon even high demand and relatively safe activities. In other words, the patrons' demand for an activity may
be great enough to enable the vendor to offer the activity profitably at the activity's full cost but yet be insufficient to overcome
the unwillingness of the vendor to go without liability insurance.
As a result, socially desirable recreational activities can disappear for insurance rather than deterrence reasons.
How can liability insurance for high demand and relatively safe
activities become unavailable or prohibitively expensive? The factors which can cause liability risks to become uninsurable include: (1) the expected amount of payout becoming too unpredictable; (2) the risks in the pool becoming too correlated; (3) the size
of the pool becoming too small to perform the diversification or

154.
155.
156.

See infra Part TV for further discussion.
Id.
For a definition of when an activity is socially desirable, see supra note 144.
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pooling function; and (4) the insurer's inability to contain either
the moral hazard problem or the threat of risk pools unraveling
due to adverse selection.'5 7 In other words, the insurer's decisions
about whether to cover an activity, and at what premium, must
take into account not only the actual danger of the activity to potential plaintiffs but also the pervasive influence of adverse selection, moral hazard, and the insurer's wish to maximize its diversification by avoiding coverage of correlated risks and of risks
that cannot be pooled. Changes in the law can affect these factors.
Since the 1960s the legal changes that may have affected these
factors include not merely the pro-patron changes in tort law surveyed in the previous subsection, but also a variety of pro-vendor
changes in insurance law (largely contract law) that have increased the insurer's liability to their vendor-insureds.1 8 These
changes, either alone or in combination with other legal changes,
may well have driven vendors who feel they need reasonably
priced liability insurance to abandon activities that were socially
desirable in a welfare sense. 159

157. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RIsK= INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLIcY 67-76 (1986) (discussing the emergence and nature of insurance risk classification). Of course insurance for any risk is available for a sufficiently high price. When
I speak of the reduced availability of insurance, I refer to the decreased gains to trade in
the market rather than the absolute refusal of insurers to cover a risk at any price.
158. An example of an insurance law case which disappointed insurers by expanding
the amount of coverage beyond that which the insurers thought their previously written
policies provided is Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
court in Keene altered the interpretation of a key concept in liability insurance policies, an
"occurrence." Id. at 1046-47. The new and much broader meaning of "occurrence" extended the liability insurers' contractual obligation to defend and indemnify the insured to
many more lawsuits against the insured than the insurers expected.
159. An explanation for the unavailability of liability insurance for recreational activities that is also consistent with the activity being high in demand and relatively safe is the
capacity constraint hypothesis. This hypothesis is that the cumulative losses over several
years by liability insurers (partly due itself to adverse changes in tort law) lowers their net
worth and depletes their capacity to insure, thereby rendering them vulnerable to a "capacity shock" which could be triggered by a sudden increase in their uncertainty about the
frequency or size of claims. This sudden increase in uncertainty may stem from a single
tort decision which changes the insurers' worst-case scenario. Rather than issuing enough
outside equity to eliminate the capacity constraint-as one might expect-insurers react
to this capacity shock by pulling back. They withdraw from territories and lines and offer
only limited coverage for large or unusual risks. Indeed a great enough increase in the uncertainty about the frequency and size of claims in a particular line may lead to an indefinite, rather than a cyclical, withdrawal from those lines. For the industry overall, however, the capacity constraint lasts only until the reduced supply of insurance drives up
premiums and profits enough for the accumulation of retained earning to restore capacity.
The capacity constraint hypothesis calls for improving the performance of liability insurance markets and avoiding recurrent crises through tort reforms which reduce undertainty about the frequency and size of claims. See Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crises
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One feature of liability insurance at least when the vendorinsured can influence the risk of liability is that both the vendor
and his insurer want the insurer to be able to contain the moral
hazard problem which all liability insurance creates. The moral
hazard problem is the tendency of vendors to reduce their precaution-taking against injury to patrons and thereby to increase the
liability risk once they are insured against that risk. 160 The
greater the moral hazard problem, the more expensive the liability insurance will be for the vendors. When the moral hazard
problem is severe enough, the vendors' demand for insurance at
the price that would be required to make the insurance profitable
will be insufficient, and the insurers will no longer offer the insurance. To contain the moral hazard problem, both the vendors
and their insurers want the insurers to be able to monitor at reasonable cost the vendors' precaution-taking. Perfect monitoring
would eliminate the moral hazard problem because insurers
would be able to make the terms of the policy, such as the policy
premium, depend on the vendors' precaution-taking. This monitoring can take a great many forms, from experience rating of the
vendors' accident record to feature rating of the vendors' activity
itself. And monitoring need not be perfect or costless for insurance to be available. Nevertheless the difficulty of monitoring the
insureds' precaution-taking can render the moral hazard problem
so severe that liability insurance will no longer be offered.''
The liability insurers' ability to monitor certain activities better
than others may explain the disappearance of the activities the
avid sportsman loves. For while the insurers may relatively easily
monitor fixed characteristics of vendors behavior that affect the
liability risk, the insurers will have much greater difficulty monitoring the vendors' daily precaution-taking. This is because daily
precaution-taking is so readily modified. For example, the insurer
can monitor relatively easily and reliably whether a horse-riding
vendor adopts a policy forbidding all patrons from taking a horse

and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988) (presenting the capacity constraint hypothesis).
160. For further definition concerning moral hazard, see Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis, supra note 140, at 1547-48. Granted, when negligent vendors are not liable to injured patrons to begin with-the usual result under the proposed rule-the vendors' incentive to reduce the injury risk to the patron is also sub-optimal. That shortcoming in the
proposed rule is discussed infra Part IV.
161. See Samuel A. Rea, Jr., The Economics of Insurance Law, 13 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 145, 150 (1993).
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unaccompanied; however, the insurer may have great difficulty
monitoring whether a vendor who offers unaccompanied rides
does so carefully by, say, day by day, refusing to offer this activity
to novice riders or by matching each rider offered this activity
with a suitable horse. The insurer may monitor relatively easily
and reliably whether a day care center has no monkey bars on its
playground, but have great difficulty monitoring whether a day
care center that does offer monkey bars carefully supervises children's use of the bars day by day. Reacting to these different
monitoring costs, the insurer who wishes to reduce liability may
only seek to influence the fixed characteristics of vendor behavior
that it can easily monitor. Hence, the conditions for coverage, or
at least for lower premiums, that the insurer imposes on the vendor will focus on these easily monitored, fixed characteristics.1 6 2
Examples of such conditions would be "accompany all riders" or
"dismantle the monkey bars."
The vendors who carefully offer unaccompanied rides or monkey bars, and the sportsmen who love these activities, will view
these conditions for coverage as absurdly crude and over inclusive. These vendors may rightly claim that these activities-as offered by them-present little liability risk in fact and, in light of
the patron demand for the activities, are socially desirable. But
the dilemma of these vendors and sportsmen resembles the dilemma of the single male car driver under the age of twenty-five
who may not be able to find reasonably priced car insurance despite his individual carefulness. All are hurt because the insurer
refuses to monitor more fully and to refine further his risk classifications. The insurer's refusal is understandable because the insurer's monitoring costs can easily exceed the advantage the insurer would gain from incurring them. From the insurer's
perspective the competitive benefits from further monitoring and
hence further refinement in its risk classifications are modest.
The insurer soon discovers that it can no longer attract or make
enough profit from additional low risk vendors to justify discovering and classifying them.
The insurer's unwillingness to incur further monitoring costs in
order to refine further its risk classifications can be attributed to
a market failure. For even if further refinement of a risk classifi-

162. See id.
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cation system would be efficient, an individual insurer would in
all probability lack an incentive to undertake such refinement.
The reason is that competitors would take advantage of the classifications introduced by the innovating insurer and compete on
an equal basis for the newly discovered low-risk insureds without
having made the investment required of the innovator. Judicial
efforts to reduce the vendor's liability could then be justified as a
collective action designed to remedy unduly crude risk classifications that deny liability insurance to socially worthwhile activi163
ties.
Granted, this explanation suggests that liability insurers
should always have imposed such conditions as "accompanying all
riders" or "dismantle the monkey bars"; it does not explain why
insurers have imposed these conditions only with the increase in
liability since the 1960s. But the increase in liability may well
have made it worthwhile for insurers to develop and impose upon
their vendors liability-reducing conditions, however crude, that
were not worth developing and imposing before.
There is another way to explain why liability premiums will be
higher, and liability insurance less available, for the daily behavior that insurers cannot monitor as easily or as reliably. The inability to monitor behavior means that insurers will be less able
to reward the careful performance of that behavior with lower
premiums and less able to punish the careless performance with
higher premiums. 16 4 Not knowing how carefully the insured day
care center supervises the use of its monkey bars, the insurer
must charge the careful as high a premium as the careless, at
least until the day care centers with monkey bars have estab-

163. Of course, it is the vendor's and the young but careful motorist's wish for liability
insurance that gives rise to the insurer's monitoring costs in the first place. Absent the
vendor's and careful motorist's wish for liability insurance, the insurer's monitoring costs
would never enter the picture. The careful riding stable and day care center, like the
young but careful motorist, know what their liability insurer cannot know, namely that
they perform the activity in question with such care that the activity is low risk and socially desirable, and they can act on that knowledge by offering or engaging in the activity.
Once the liability insurer, saddled with his monitoring costs, enters the picture in response to the vendor's wish for liability insurance, his monitoring costs are, in effect,
passed on to vendors in the form of restrictive conditions for coverage or increased premiums, and ultimately passed on to patrons in the form of either higher prices for the vendors' activities or the vendors' abandonment of those activities entirely.
164. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 140, at 1539-40. For a detailed analysis of how insurance pools and individual risk are calculated, see id. at 1539-
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lished a track record which enables the insurer to discriminate
among them.'6 5 The effect is that, at least in the short run, vendors are given less incentive to perform the unmonitorable behav166
ior carefully and, hence, should exercise marginally less care.
Thus, in deciding whether to cover an activity, in setting premium, and in imposing conditions, the insurer must assume that
activities whose performance it cannot monitor and which can be
performed in a dangerous way will tend, at least at the margin, to
be performed in that dangerous way. 16 Those unmonitorable and
potentially dangerous activities will be insured, if at all, only at a
16
higher premium. 1
There are other features of liability insurance markets that can
explain why increased liability would render such insurance unavailable even for high demand and relatively safe activities. But
one must recognize that this drying up of liability insurance need
not stem-indeed logically would not stem-from a mere scalar
increase in the amount of liability. An increase in the size of the
liability risk raises both the supply and demand curves for coverage. As the vendors' liability exposure increases, the gains to
trade between vendors and their liability insurers increases
rather than decreases.'6 9 Provided that the insurers face no added
problems in diversifying against this increased risk, they will see
the increased risk as an opportunity and the availability of insurance should not decline.
Of all the imperfections in liability insurance markets, perhaps
the most well-known are the imperfections from adverse selec-

165. See id. at 1540-42.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. To be sure, the disappearance of unmonitorable activities is only a social
welfare loss when the activities as offered were not unduly dangerous in fact. Because the
care with which these activities were offered could not be monitored, the vendor who offered them lacked the optimum incentive to be careful. Ceteris paribus unmonitorable activities are less likely than monitorable activities to be offered with care.
169. In contrast, a scalar increase in liability hurts those sportsmen who prefer a lower
price for the activity to the possibility of suing for their injuries. They will need to pay the
higher price the increased liability forces the vendor to charge, an increase tantamount to
a transfer payment from patrons who do not sue to those who do. Accordingly, these
sportsmen have much more reason to oppose a scalar increase in liability than does the
vendor's liability insurer. The insurer's increase in business and profit is one reason
sportsmen cannot rely on the lobbyists for the liability insurance industry to impress upon
legislatures or courts the sportsmen's interest in reducing vendor liability.
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tion."7 ° Because of adverse selection, increased liability will often
trigger an unraveling of insurance risk pools that may render
even relatively safe and highly valued activities uninsurable-or
insurable only at a premium incommensurate with their dangerousness."' The unraveling is avoided as long as the variance in
the liability risks brought to the risk pool by the high risk insureds, compared to the low risk insureds, is contained. 17 2 Increased
liability can increase that variance and thereby trigger an exodus
from the pool by the low risk members that begins the unraveling
process. 7 3 As applied to motels with diving boards, the increase
in liability from having the board might have triggered an unraveling by slightly increasing the apparent variance in the liability
risks brought to the motel insurers pool by the high risk motels
(those with a diving board) and the low risk motels (those without
a diving board).'7 4 The exodus of those low risk motels from the
pool in response to that increase in apparent variance might have
driven the liability insurers to create and offer separate policies
for the high risk and low risk motels. 7 5 The higher insurance
premiums for the motels with diving boards might have put those
motels at a competitive disadvantage in attracting customers who
know in advance they will not use a diving board.'7 6 If those
customers sufficiently outnumbered customers who desired the
board, that competitive disadvantage may have meant that the
motels with boards profited more by dismantling the board and
retaining their competitive appeal to the greater number of customers with no use for the board. 77

170. Adverse selection is generally defined as "the tendency of persons with relatively
greater exposure to risk to seek insurance protection." Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 140, at 1541.
171. See id. at 1562.
172. See id. at 1541. The variance is simply the difference in the risk presented by the
high and low risk insureds in the same insurance pool. Technically it is measured by the
square of the sum of the difference between the expected liability of each member of the
pool and the expected liability of the member of average risk. See id.
173. See id. at 1563-64.
174. See id. at 1564-65.
175. See id. at 1573.
176. See id. at 1571.
177. See id. The same phenomena may be at work when airlines offer no-frills service,
not because the forgone amenities cost more than the value consumers assign to them, but
because the airline feels keeping low rates will attract those who might otherwise drive.
See id. at 1572.
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The explanation may be followed more easily if one considers
the situation from the perspective, not of the insured motel, but of
its liability insurer. From the insurer's perspective, the enhanced
liability of motels with boards, though itself causing only a minor
increase in the variance of the risk pool of motels, raises the cost
of insuring that pool by a prohibitive amount because it increases
the chance of motels without diving boards dropping out of the insurance pool and triggering the unraveling process. 178 Minor increases in the variance of a risk pool often have such a disproportionate effect. And insurers will predictably react to any
phenomenon which threatens to increase the variance of the pool
and to trigger unraveling by reconstituting the pool so as to restore the variance to manageable limits. 1 79 If certain activities of
the insured, like offering a diving board, disproportionately appear to increase the variance of the pool so as to threaten the unraveling process, the insurer's reconstitution of the pool may take
the form of refusing to cover those activities. That refusal may
merely represent the insurer's wish to reduce the apparent variance of risk in the eyes of the low risk insureds, with the insurer's
goal being to keep those low risk insureds in the pool.
Note that if those motel customers who know they will not use
the diving board receive a better value from motels without
boards thanks to the lower liability insurance premiums those
motels must pay, any flight of those customers from motels with
boards will also mean higher insurance premiums for motels with
boards no matter how carefully motels with boards behave."8 ' In
the insurers' eyes, motels with boards have become more dangerous just because of the nature of the customers attracted to them.
A similar unraveling of risk pools occurred when manufacturers
of four-wheel drive trucks became increasingly liable for injuries
suffered during off-road use of the trucks.'8 ' The many customers
for such trucks who were not interested in off-road use but who
enjoyed other advantages of four-wheel drive appeared to react to
the modest increase in liability (which they experienced as a
modest increase in their liability insurance premiums) by switching to four-wheel drive vans and station wagons that could not be

178. See id. at 1541.
179. See id. at 1542.
180. See id. at 1571. For a discussion regarding adverse selection, see supra note 170
and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 1564-65.
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used off road. l" 2 That flight of the low risk members of the risk
pool significantly raised the truck manufacturers' liability insurance premiums per truck, just because of the nature of the customers who still bought the trucks."8 3
Unexpected expansions of liability also hurt vendors because
they seem to exert an in terrorem effect on those who promote the
vendors' activities. Trade associations of travel agents and travel
managers have reacted to damage awards against motels with
diving boards by advising their members against booking clients
into such hotels out of fear the travel agent or manager will be
subject to liability as well, apparently on the ground of negligent
booking." 4 Given the absence of reported opinions holding travel
agents and managers liable for negligent booking, this reaction is
hard to explain. But an operator of such a motel who was able to
find liability insurance or brave enough to do without it might
well dismantle his board rather than see such travel agents and
managers steer his customers away. Hence, the in terrorem effect
of expanded liability, by raising the specter of still further expansions, ripples through the industry.
And because a motel's diving board may serve as a "litogen"
(i.e., any aspect of an activity that triggers liability out of proportion to its actual dangerousness), even an accurate and reliable
estimate of the extent to which retaining the diving board increases the motel's liability may tell little about the actual danger
of the board." 5 For this reason alone, the liability insurer's judgment not to insure motels with boards or to raise the premium
charged such motels will not support a reliable inference about
the board's social value.

182. Id. at 1565.
183. Id.
184. See 23 AM. SOC'Y OF TRAVEL AGENTS NEWS & NOTES 1 (1974).
185. The term was originally used by Robert L. Brent, M.D., to describe bendectin, a
drug used to combat nausea in pregnant women and also the source of much litigation in
the 1970s and 80s. As a result of the litigation, bendectin was pulled off the market by its
manufacturer in 1983, yet it has never been proven to cause birth defects. MARCH OF
DIMES, BENDECTIN MAKING A COMEBACK, at http://www.marchofdimes.com/professionals/
6811820.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). Hence Dr. Brent called it a "litogen," a word
similar to carcinogen (a substance that causes cancer) and teratogen (a substance that
causes birth defects), but meaning a substance that causes litigation. Editorial Comment,
Teratogen Update: Bendectin, 31 TERATOLOGY 429-30 (1985). The word was used again in
PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 28 (Kenneth R. Foster et al., eds.,
1999). For the specific claim that a diving board is a litogen, see Sobo, supra note 2, at 179
(describing the necessary conditions for "litogen" but never stating the term).
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There are other insurance concerns-other features of liability
insurance markets-that explain why increased liability may
lead liability insurers to refuse to cover high demand and relatively safe activities. Again, no one should uncritically assume
that the availability and price of liability insurance for offering an
activity depends only on the activity's actual dangerousness. For
example, increased liability through pro-patron changes in tort
law or pro-vendor changes in insurance law can dry up liability
insurance for vendors simply because it increases the insurers'
uncertainty about its future pay-out rates beyond a manageable
limit."8 6 That uncertainty can stem from the insurers' lack of experience with how courts will apply the legal changes in practice
or from the insurers' concern about the heightened chance of further legal changes increasing liability still more.
While liability insurance exists to deal with a certain level of
uncertainty about future liability, too much uncertainty about
payouts destroys insurability. Liability insurance is still predominantly "occurrence" insurance, that is, the insurer insures
the insured against liability arising from the insured's actions
within the coverage period even though the insured's liability,
and hence the insured's need to pay, may not be determined for
years in the future and will be determined under the liability
rules and systems prevailing then. Hence, the risk that further
legal changes will increase liability falls almost entirely on the
insurer. Insurers who underestimate the liability risk will charge
inappropriately small premiums which will not cover their payouts. Insurers who overestimate liability risks will charge excessive premiums with the result that they will sell too little insurance. Enough uncertainty about either the chance that liability
will be imposed or the amount of that liability when imposed and
the insurer cannot set appropriate premiums and may opt
against insuring the activity at all.
The risk that the vendor's liability will increase because of the
changes in legal doctrine or in the operation of the litigation system is especially costly to insure against because it is not an independent risk.8 7 That is, the increased liability from a pro-

186. Priest, The CurrentInsuranceCrisis, supranote 140, at 1550-63.
187. See Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract Structure and OrganizationalForm of Insurance Firms, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY

187, 188 (1993) (stating that liability insurance suffers from nonindependence where the
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patron legal change is likely to raise the liability burden of all of
the insurer's vendors and not merely of a few of them."'8 Hence,
the insurer cannot diversify against the risk of legal changes by
insuring a large number of stables or a large number of motels
with diving boards."8 9 In the words of the insurance industry, the
liability risk is not diversifiable within the insurance pool.1 90 Even
insuring vendors in different states will not adequately diversify
against the risk of legal changes because the chance of a legal
change increasing vendor liability in one state is positively correlated with the chance of similar legal changes in all other
states. 9 ' Nor will insuring many different types of vendors diversify against the risk of a legal change, for the risk of a legal
change which would increase the liability burden of one type of
vendor correlates with the risk of a legal change increasing the
liability of other types of vendors. 9 2 That such correlation inevitably results from stare decisis and the manner in which the
common law evolves gives no comfort to the insurer. 93
Once vendors start abandoning an activity, the liability insurer
for the remaining vendors will incur increased costs in continuing
to provide coverage simply because there are not enough vendors
offering the activity or enough patrons purchasing the activity.19 4
Merely insuring a sufficient number of vendors who sell to a sufficient number of patrons helps a liability insurer diversify its
risk.19 5 If there are not enough vendors or patrons, then, in the
eyes of the insurer, the patrons and vendors are performing too
little of the diversification or pooling function themselves. The liability insurer needs to find many vendors whose risks of liability
are uncorrelated and who each serve an ample number of patrons

rules under which liability is determined and damages are assessed change over the life of
the insurance contract because new legislation or judicial precedent might change the
rules altogether).
188. See id. (theorizing that the "risk will not be eliminated by pooling").
189. See id.
190. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INS. AVAILABILITY

AND AFFORDABILITY 79 (1986).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Doherty & Dionne, supra note 187, at 200 n.3 (discussing how mass torts and
toxic torts challenge courts to create new innovative liability rules that could redefine coverage).
194. See Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis,supra note 140, at 1562.
195. See id. at 1542.
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in order to achieve the pooling efficiency of insurance.196 When
the number of bungee jump vendors declined somewhat following
legal restrictions on bungee jumping in Florida, some liability insurers withdrew entirely from the bungee jumping market and
gave as their reason that too few vendors remained for adequate
diversification of the liability risk.197 The insurers' testimony further undermines the claim that the reason for an activity's disappearance after a liability increase is that the activity is so much
more dangerous than patrons appreciate, and so little in demand,
that it could not be offered profitably once part of its injury costs
were internalized through liability.
Of course the lack of liability insurance for an activity would
not lead vendors to abandon the activity if vendors did not feel a
need for liability insurance. But vendors, typically small businesses, are generally more risk averse against liability losses
than large businesses. Owners of large businesses are more able
to diversify risk by varying the content of their portfolios. Moreover small businesses improve their internal prospects more
when they can count on the relatively stable earnings configuration for the future that liability insurance provides. Their small
size not only makes vendors more risk averse, it eliminates the
option of self-insurance, an option that reportedly appeals to the
few vendors as huge as Disney World. Perhaps one reason selfinsurance is not an option for smaller vendors is because they do
not offer enough activities so that their liability risks will tend to
average out within their activities themselves. The sportsmen's
hope-that the shields of limited liability and bankruptcy would
induce some small vendors to go bare or that fly-by-night and undercapitalized vendors would step up to offer the activities established vendors no longer offer-has not materialized. In light of
the substantial fixed costs of developing a horse riding stable, hotel, motel, YMCA, amusement park, day care center, or trampoline center, not to mention a ski area or a private school, this is
hardly surprising.198

196. Id.
197. Thomas H. Ehrhardt, Note, What Price Human Flight?Bungee JumpingAccidents
Indicate Need for More Expeditious Regulation of Potentially Hazardous Activities, 25

RUTGERS L.J. 853, 865-67 (1994).
198. Individual sportsmen who endanger others seem much more willing than vendors
to proceed without insurance. Perhaps that is because they suspect that without liability
insurance, they either won't be sued by those they injure or won't actually pay even if they
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Similarly, no one should infer from risk averse vendors refusing to offer activities for which they cannot obtain liability insurance that the activity is socially undesirable. Imagine how many
risk averse individuals would refuse to drive a car if no automobile insurance was available. No policymaker should, therefore,
conclude that driving by these individuals is too dangerous to be
socially desirable. Rather, the policymaker should recognize that
one reason the absence of insurance is socially harmful is precisely that the risk averse will refuse to engage in socially desirable activities. Likewise, imagine the likely driving behavior, if no
liability insurance was available, of many who would be willing to
drive.'9 9 On witnessing their slow speed and their precautions to
avoid liability, should the policymaker conclude that these precautions are socially desirable? On the contrary, the policymaker
should suspect that these precautions, not being taken when insurance was available, are excessively costly. The policymaker
should recognize that another reason the absence of insurance is
socially harmful is precisely because the risk averse will resort to
excessively costly precautions. In short, the vice lies in the lack of
readily available and competitively priced liability insurance, not
in the activities which the lack of insurance leads people to
forego.2 00 If the tort liability imposed on those activities, for whatever reason, including the peculiarities of insurance markets,
contributed to the lack of insurance, the policymaker should reconsider that tort liability.
Before the 1960s, common law courts were more sensitive to
the possibility that imposing tort liability which was difficult to
insure against would drive businesses that needed liability insurance to abandon worthwhile activities. Courts rightly saw it was
no small evil for tort liability to eliminate worthwhile activities

are sued successfully. The effect of a New York law mandating that snowmobiles carry liability insurance suggests that individual sportsmen prefer not to have insurance. N.Y.
INS. LAW § 5202(a) (Consol. 2001). Both before and after the law, snowmobilers were liable
for injuries caused by their negligence. See Michael Levy, Snowmobilers Ask Higher Fees
to Maintain Trails, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 10, 1999, at 1B, available at 1999 WL 4585135. In
that respect, the law did not increase snowmobilers' liability at all. See id. Nevertheless
the law markedly reduced the number of snowmobilers. See id.
199. The benefit of encouraging desirable behavior by reducing risks is common to all
insurance, not just liability insurance. For example, the property insurance portion of
homeowner's insurance induces more people to buy homes.
200. This is not to recommend making more liability insurance available to vendors. In
the modern legal environment more liability insurance encourages courts to expand liability further. See Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis, supra note 140, at 1538-39.
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for insurance reasons, thus narrowing the options available for
the rest of society. Courts were not as myopically fixed as modern
courts on compensating the injured plaintiff and deterring the
causally negligent defendant and were more open to the possibility that larger concerns argued against liability. In a famous article, Professor Charles 0. Gregory pointed out that several lines of
cases from the pre-1960 era denying liability could best be explained by the judicial conviction that, for one reason or another,
defendants would not be able to insure themselves at a reasonable cost against the liability that plaintiffs sought and, hence,
might abandon desirable activities.2 °' In the city-wide fire cases,
for example, where owners of property destroyed by the fire sued
either the business whose negligence caused the fire or the water
works company whose negligence caused the spread of the fire,
the courts found some rubric, typically lack of proximate cause or
lack of duty, on which to turn away the property owners.0 2 The
courts appreciated, Professor Gregory argued, that the liability
risks being insufficiently independent, liability insurers for the
defendant could not diversify against this potentially huge liability risk at a reasonable cost. 2 3 The potential chill on risk-creating
businesses threatened by the specter of liability without insurance required the court to dismiss negligence suits against the defendant businesses in such sweeping terms that any future suits
would be stopped at their inception. 20 4 To let the cases go forward,
the courts realized, would let the fear of uninsured against liability unduly curtail worthwhile activities. 2 5 The fear of liability

201.

Charles 0. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L.

REV. 30, 59-60 (1951).

202. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928) (holding that
neither the city nor the water company has a legal duty to supply water to city residents);
Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866) (holding that defendant is not liable
for damages to remote buildings).
Even in the 19th century Ryan was not universally adopted. See THOMAS G. SHEARMAN
& AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 33-34 (1898). Occasion-

ally a modern court will consider the impact of liability on the continued existence of socially valuable activities and products. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155
(2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing a negligent marketing claim in order to avoid driving handguns
off the market); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to
allow a third generation of drug victims to sue drug manufacturer on the ground that
these suits would unduly burden the distribution of drugs).
203. Gregory, supra note 201, at 59-60.
204. See, e.g., Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 155 (dismissing plaintiffs claim at the summary
judgment stage).
205. See id. (recognizing the important public policy of having prescription drugs available).
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would share the effect of Hamlet's fear: "enterprises of great pith
and moment [w]ith this regard their currents turn awry [aind
2 6
lose the name of action.""
The various reasons why increased liability can cause the disappearance of recreational activities are, of course, merely possible explanations for the disappearance of the activities in question. Given the multitude of explanations for why an activity
disappears-from changing consumer tastes, to the appearance of
substitute activities-no explanation can be put forth with confidence. As others have emphasized, even industry experts may not
be able to distinguish when an activity is abandoned due to consumer preference from when it is abandoned due to increased liability.20 7 For instance, the timing surrounding the disappearance
of hotel and motel diving boards strongly suggests that increased
liability was the culprit there. Almost all hotel and motel chains
removed their diving boards from their swimming pools within a
few months of each other in 1974. The triggering event appeared
to be a $7 million judgment against the Sheraton Park Hotel (now
renamed the Sheraton Washington) awarded to eighteen-year-old
Thomas Hooks.20 8 Hooks dove from a three meter board of the
Sheraton pool and continued underwater until he ultimately
struck his head on the part of the pool's bottom which was sloping
upward.20 9 Apparently, Hooks' winning theory of negligence was
that the Sheraton was negligent for installing an Olympic-style
aluminum diving board in place of the previous wooden board.2 10
According to the plaintiff-and apparently the jury-the aluminum board, which followed the design used in the 1972 Munich
Olympics, projected divers too high in the air.2"1' Within a few
days of that judgment Joseph McInerney, Vice-President and Director of Operations for the Sheraton Corporation, issued the
fateful letter that marked the end of the diving board era. Referring to the Hooks award, and on the advice of Sheraton's attor-

206. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
207. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis,supra note 141, at 1562.
208. Hooks v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 316.
211. Id. Those offering swimming pools with diving boards have also been sued on the
basis that their diving board did not have "enough spring." Earnsberger v. Griffiths Park
Swim Club, No. 20882, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3792, at *5 (Ohio App. July 24, 2002) (stating that the plaintiff attributed his knee injury to the fact that the diving "board 'did not
give' or have 'enough spring"').
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neys, McInerney concluded, "[b]ecause of this award, Sheraton is
removing all diving boards from all its properties." Hotel chains
around the country soon followed Sheraton's lead.2 12
On the other hand, some pool manufacturers believe diving
boards were doomed to disappear soon in any event because lap
swimming and family play while wading, which benefit more
from a shallow pool, have increased in popularity more than diving has. 213 The popularity of diving, which provides few fitness
benefits, did not gain from the fitness craze of the 1970s and
1980s as did the popularity of lap swimming.2 1" A pool of the size
and depth appropriate for a one-meter diving board2 15 may have
progressively become a poorer investment for motels and hotels
than a shallow pool of uniform depth given the cost savings of the
latter and given that the diving area will probably cut in half the
area for lap swimming or family play. Patron tastes may also
have changed simply because the income of patrons has risen. As
income rises, the patrons' opportunity costs of incurring an injury
should also rise, creating a stronger patron preference for safer
activities. Shallow pools of uniform depth would then come to replace pools with diving boards simply because the shallow pools
appeared safer.
While a possible change in patron tastes may explain the absence of boards in new pools, those tastes would hardly change so
suddenly as to explain the dismantling of boards in pools designed for boards. Only liability concerns seem to explain the willingness of hotels, motels, and YMCAs in the months following the
McInerney letter in 1974 to undertake such value-decreasing be-

212. For an account of the facts surrounding Hooks, and the subsequent removal of diving boards from hotels and motels around the country, see Anthony Marshall, Remembrance of an Incident that ChangedHotels Forever, 211 HOTEL & MOTEL MGMT. 15 ( 1996),

available at LEXIS, Markets & Industry Archive News Library. Eventually plaintiff
agreed to a remittitur of damages and the judgment for plaintiff was upheld on appeal.
Hooks, 578 F.2d at 319.
213. Telephone Interview with Joseph Grimes, Owner, Grimes Pools, Inc. (Oct. 11,
1998).
214. See id.
215. I mean appropriate for divers exercising minimal care to keep from striking the
bottom or sides of the pool. For such a diver the standard water depth, the standard slope
rise, and the standard throw area recommended by the National Pool and Spa Institute
are fully adequate. Some courts have found that pools with boards must be adequate for
the foolish or drunken diver as well. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75. To the extent that diving boards have disappeared because of such requirements, their disappearance is, of course, attributable to liability.
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havior. Moreover, the dismantling of boards in so many pools may
itself have caused the relative decline in diving's popularity by
depriving patrons of a convenient opportunity to discover the joy
of diving, to learn to dive, or, at least, to overcome their natural
fear of diving.
In sum, this section argues for an agnostic attitude when previously commonplace and popular recreational activities disappear during a period in which the vendors of the activities face increased liability. Rarely can one be confident that the increased
liability caused the disappearance of an activity. But, most importantly, no one can be confident that the activities that have disappeared were so dangerous and provided patrons such modest
benefit that their disappearance has increased social welfare.2 16

III. THE VALUE OF THE LOST ACTIVITIES
"They hate us youth."
Falstaff
The agnosticism argued for in the previous section in no way
supports the current law's harsh treatment of vendors and avid
sportsmen. On the contrary, the possibility that tort liability has
reduced social welfare by eliminating worthwhile and lawful activities is sobering. A law that deprives people of socially desirable options has much to answer for.
Once one can no longer presume that the loss of an activity increased social welfare, a glance at the value of what has been lost
becomes appropriate. The lost or at least endangered activities,
such as taking a horse on a trail unaccompanied, diving at motel

216. Even if an activity is so dangerous to the unprepared or foolish patrons that its
disappearance increases social welfare, the activity might yet increase social welfare if
there was some way it could profitably be made available only to those who prepared, and
then took care, to protect themselves. Those who rent equipment and sell air to scuba divers, and probably all those selling to the scuba diving industry, may have survived the
modern expansion of liability only because of the industry's certification system. By keeping scuba diving unavailable to novices and those without minimal qualifications, PAUI
and NAUI have helped to hold the industry's liability burden to manageable levels without
the need to rely on release agreements. This is not to suggest that similar efforts at industry self-regulation will bring back the activities that have disappeared. If the vendors of
those activities could have profitably limited access to their activities to the qualified, they
would have done so.
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pools, renting a boat for waterskiing, or hanging from monkey
bars in a daycare playground, share certain features besides the
risk of injury they all present to the patron. 217 They are what others have called flow activities in that they offer patrons an opportunity for a flow experience.2 18 While not easily defined, flow refers to that inner reverie from the temporary merging of an
actor's actions and awareness. 2 9 Typically, flow also involves a
temporary loss of ego as the actor takes respite from negotiating
between his own needs and the social demands placed upon
him.220 According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi of the University of
Chicago, flow activities must avoid boredom and anxiety by
matching an actor's abilities with his opportunities for applying
those abilities. 22' That is, flow activities must be neither too easy
(hence boredom) nor too difficult (hence anxiety) and ideally
should give the actor himself a chance to calibrate finely the difficulty to his abilities.22 2 While flow can come from work as well as
play, for instance the surgeon's flow from surgery, the flow exitself.223
perience appears to need no goals or rewards external to
Nevertheless, flow rarely comes from activities in which mistakes
carry no penalty. 224 Mistakes inevitably carry penalties when flow
comes from work, but that need not be the case with play.2 2 With
226
play the risk of physical injury can constitute that penalty.
Moreover, the risks can serve as a means to focus attention on the
activity and to provide feedback to the actor's skill. 227 Rather than

217. Throughout this section of the article "risk" refers only to the risk to the patron
himself and not to the risk to others.
218.

MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE 72

(1990) [hereinafter FLOW]; see BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 38-49. Following Max Weber,
Jessie Bernard's name for eustress-seeking behavior is "eudemonism." Jessie Bernard, The
Eudaemonists, in WHY MAN TAKES CHANCES 10 (Samuel Z. Klausner ed., 1968) (citing
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 78 (1948)). Johan

Huizinga also maintains that earnest play can transport the player to another state of
consciousness. Johan Huizinga, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN
CULTURE 19-21, 44-45 (1938).
219. FLOW, supra note 218, at 39-40.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 74-77.
See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 49; FLOW, supra note 220, at 74-75.
See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 47, 123-39.
See id. at 138.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 46.
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being a hindrance to the actor's enjoyment, the risks of injury are
part of the challenge that provide the flow experience.2 28
Some researchers have suggested that flow activities provide a
wide range of benefits beyond the often exquisite pleasure of the
flow experience itself.2 29 Flow activities provide the stimulation
needed to satisfy the actor's physiological need for optimal
arousal.2 3 ° Flow activities seem to aid creativity, in particular
adaptive flexibility-the ability to change strategies when confronted with a problem.23 1 They also seem to increase spontaneous
fluency, render actors less dependent on others, and improve
mood. 2 Meeting the challenge of a flow activity builds one's feeling of "effectance"23 3 and of "potential control,"2 34 two aspects of
self-confidence. Even those lucky persons for whom work is a flow
experience benefit significantly from finding different areas in
2 35
which to experience flow.
The possibility of flow aside, the activities in question share
further benefits that other varieties of physical play may not. By
providing an opportunity for an actor continually to test his skills,
23 6
they allow the actor to measure himself and learn his limits.
They allow the actor's skills and his ability to protect himself to
develop.23 7 Several of the activities help the actor learn to cope

228. See id. at 45.
229. Id. at 99 (stating that rock climbers experience a "heightened sense of physical
achievement, a feeling of harmony with the environment, trust in climbing companions,
and clarity in purpose").
230. M.J. ELLIS, WHY PEOPLE PLAY 80 (1973). See also GEORGE LEONARD, THE
ULTIMATE ATHLETE 220 (1974) (noting that researchers have seen a qualitative difference
between the arousal potential of volleyball or tennis which tend to exhaust participants,
on the one hand, and rock climbing and skiing which tend to exhilarate participants, on
the other).
231. See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 44.
232. Id. at 156.
233. Robert W. White, Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence, 66
PSYCHOL. REV. 297, 321-23 (1959) [hereinafter Motivation].
234. See Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: An Attributional
Analysis, in HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 3-4 (Judy Garber & Martin E.P.
Seligman eds., 1980); MARTIN E. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH 105 (1975) (stating that a feeling of a lack of control can foster
depression and helplessness). Others have described the adoptive function of risk-taking
in evolution. See generally MELVIN KONNER, WHY THE RECKLESS SURVIVE... AND OTHER
SECRETS OF HUMAN NATURE 4-16 (1990).
235. See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 139; FLOW, supra note 218, at 162-63.
236. See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 139.
237. Id.
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with relatively unsanitized nature.23 Coping with the challenges
of nature appears to build self-esteem better than does coping
with artificially created environments.2 3 9 It also reduces any estrangement of the actor from his physical environment.
The activities in question also share the benefits of all physical
play. These include providing an outlet for aggression and for
self-expression, discharging super-abundant energy and relaxing
after exertion.24 ° Because the activities are physically stimulating, they also provide the usual physiological benefits.24 ' At least
one researcher maintains that the benefits extend beyond the patron himself. Samuel Klausner asserts that allowing some in society to risk physical injury for no apparent utilitarian purpose
"contributes to the general optimism that society will indeed have
the strength to achieve its goals" and, if properly controlled, contributes to social cohesion.24 2
Because the activities do not appeal to everyone or to every
group in society equally, the burden of the tort decisions which
tend to eliminate the activities falls unevenly across society.
Marvin Zuckerman, Ralph Keyes, and others have demonstrated
that individuals differ in their need for physical stimulation and
variation.2 43 Their research has identified a sensation-seeking
trait that can be measured and that has been empirically linked

238. Id.
239. See id.; Robert W. White, Competence and the Psychosexual Stages of Development, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 100-03 (Marshal R. Jones ed., 1960); Motivation, supra note 233, at 297, 317-18.
240. See KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 243-45 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 1963)

(stating that aggression must be discharged for humans to flourish). See generally
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND MENTAL HEALTH (William P. Morgan ed., 1997); P.H. FENTEM ET
AL., BENEFITS OF EXERCISE: THE EVIDENCE (1990) (listing articles explaining benefits of

exercise).
241. For example, they provide better muscle tone, improved coordination, strength,
balance, and some improvement in fitness.
242. Samuel Z. Klausner, The Intermingling of Pain and Pleasure: The Stress-Seeking
Personality in Its Social Context, in WHY MAN TAKES CHANCES: STUDIES IN STRESSSEEKING 164 (Samuel Z. Klausner ed., 1968).
243. See DONALD W. FISKE & SALVATORE R. MADDI, FUNCTIONS OF VARIED EXPERIENCE
444 (1961). See generally RALPH KEYES, CHANCING IT: WHY WE TAKE RISKS 21 (1985);
MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF SENSATION
SEEKING (1994) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS]; MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION
SEEKING: BEYOND THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF AROUSAL (1979) [hereinafter SENSATION

SEEKING]. That some individuals crave and appear to need much more stimulation than
others is often a subject of art. See, e.g., MY DINNER WITH ANDRE (Fox Lorber Studios
1981) (depicting the story of two characters who need vastly different amounts of stimulation to stay emotionally "alive").
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with voluntary risk-taking behavior.24 4 Their research suggests
that predisposition toward high or low levels of sensation-seeking
is associated with different levels of the neurotransmitter norepinephrine which stimulates neural activity and which in turn is
regulated by the enzyme Monamine Oxidase ("MAO"). 245 High
MAO levels are associated with low norepinephrine levels.24 6 High
sensation-seekers tend to have lower MAO levels which suggests
that they have a greater level of norepinephrine.2 4 7 More recently,
a group of scientists in Israel have identified a gene associated
with sensation-seeking.2 41 In contrast, other researchers claim
that "social factors, perhaps in combination with personality predispositions, have more influence on various forms of risk-taking
behavior than underlying physiological traits."24 9
Whatever its origin, a preference for high sensation-seeking is
shared by a minority in society that identifies itself by its voluntary risk-taking behavior. That preference correlates with many
positive characteristics. High sensation-seekers tend to possess a
receptive and tolerant attitude toward unfamiliar ideas and experience and relatively little fear for physical safety.250 They view
their emotions positively and express them openly. 25 1 A psychological study of rock climbers concluded that they share a "tendency to regard conventional norms as provisional not because of
an antisocial posture but because of experience seeking or developmental aspirations toward self-actualization."2 52
The alienated, defined here as those who derive less enjoyment
from normal instrumental activities, suffer more from the ab-

244.

Michael R. Levenson, Risk Taking and Personality, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. 1073, 1074 (1990); ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS, supra note 243, at

124 ("[I]n those situations that do entail risk, high sensation seekers find the sensations or
experiences worth the risk, whereas the low sensation seekers either do not value the sensations of the activity, or do not think they are worth the risk."); ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION
SEEKING, supra note 246, at 339-44 (discussing MAO levels and their inverse relationship
with sensation-seeking).
245. ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION SEEKING, supra note 243, at 340.
246. Id. at 344.
247. Id.
248. Marvin Zuckerman, Are you a Risk-Taker?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1, 2000, at 5456, 87.
249. Levenson, supra note 244, at 1074.
250. ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION SEEKING, supra note 243, at 181-82.
251. Id.
252. Levenson, supra note 244, at 1078.

2004]

WHEN EXCULPATORY CLAUSES SHOULD BE ENFORCED

441

sence of high sensation-seeking activities. 2 3 The alienated depend
more on non-instrumental activities like the recreational activities which liability has curtailed for their self-perception and enjoyment. 2 4 High sensation-seeking activities offer the alienated
one of their relatively few opportunities to experience competence.25 5
High sensation-seeking appears disproportionately in western
males compared to non-western males and in males across all cultures compared to females. 256 Sensation-seeking also appears to
decline with age.257 Among the boys and young men who disproportionately suffer from the loss of the activities in question, the
less wealthy are hit the hardest. Enough wealth helps the avid
sportsman to overcome the loss of some of the activities. When
horses cannot be rented and taken unaccompanied, the wealthy
can more easily buy and maintain them. When all ski slopes are
groomed, the wealthy can more easily pay for a helicopter ride to
an off-piste area. When no public or YMCA pools offer diving
boards, the wealthy can more easily install their own board, if
they are able to find a willing seller.
The disparate impact of liability on less wealthy boys and
young men would be of less concern if one could be confident that
any judge would appreciate the importance to high sensationseekers of having affordable and spirited recreational activities
available. But the research of Ralph Keyes suggests that the high
sensation-seeker's perspective on risky activities is almost unintelligible to low sensation-seekers.2 58 In her work on sensationseeking in couples, Ilda Ficher also found that the "difference between a high and low sensation-seeker represents a basic difference in values, risk estimations, and general outlook on life." 259 If
only because of their age, judges are disproportionately likely to
be low sensation-seekers themselves.

253. See BOREDOM, supra note 63, at 174-75.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking, Mania, and Monoamines, 13
NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 121, 122 (1985) [hereinafter Mania and Monoamines].
257. Id. at 122.
258. KEYES, supra note 243, at 51.
259. Ilda V. Ficher, et al., Sensation-Seeking Congruence in Couples as a Determinant
of MaritalAdjustment: A PartialReplication and Extension, 44 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 803,
803 (1988).
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High sensation-seekers are not content with normal recreation
presenting little risk, such as running or bowling. They seek activities presenting the challenge of taking an authentic risk,
meeting and overcoming the fear it evokes, and persevering to
success.26 ° According to Zuckerman, whether the high sensationseeker can find a satisfactory way of life may depend on the opportunities for expressing his trait that his culture provides him.
[High sensation-seekers] seek the particular phenomenal expressions of the trait that are provided by a particular culture. Conversely, the low-sensation seekers will "burrow into" whatever forms
of security and stability are provided by the social order. Since most
social structures are built on impulse inhibition, there are usually
more opportunities for low sensation-seekers
to find a satisfactory
261
way of life than there are for highs.

Like Zuckerman, sociologist Jessie Bernard maintains that modern Western society fails to provide enough lawful activities for
high sensation-seekers to flourish.2 62
Perhaps because its origin is at least partly biochemical, the
sensation preference is not easily suppressed. Raise the cost or
curtail the availability of lawful sensation-seeking and at least
some persons will turn to substitutes. One possible substitute is
antisocial and self-destructive sensation-seeking-most commonly drug and alcohol abuse and crime, especially delinquency.
That much antisocial and self-destructive conduct springs from
the wish for sensation has been well documented.2 6 3 The extent to
which those who engage in such undesirable conduct will actually
substitute risky recreational activities, in contrast, remains unknown.

260.

LEONARD, supra note 230, at 220.

261.

ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION SEEKING, supra note 243, at 375; see also ZUCKERMAN,

BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS, supra note 243, at 166 ("Very often the only exciting things in
lower socioeconomic class neighborhoods are crime and drugs.").
262. BERNARD, supra note 218, at 46-47.
263. See ZUCKERMAN, SENSATION SEEKING, supra note 243, at 278-79; Thomas S.
Szasz, M.D., The Role of the Counterphobic Mechanism in Addiction, 6 J. AM.
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 309, 323 (1958) (stating that anti-social and self-destructive conduct such as drug use creates "sham adversaries" that one then tries to master when ordinary life lacks sufficient challenge). See generally Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Deviant Drug
and Alcohol Use: The Role ofAnxiety, Sensation Seeking, and Other Personality Variables,
in EMOTIONS AND ANXIETY: NEW CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 247 (Marvin
Zuckerman & Charles D. Spielberger eds., 1976).
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Like low risk sports, watching TV and playing computer and
video games would not qualify as substitutes because they do not
supply the high sensation-seeker with appropriate stimulation.
The sensation-seekers' resort to them is tantamount to giving up
the search. Yet, as Sydney Margolin tried to show in his psychoanalytical and psycho-sociological studies of the Prairie Indians,
giving up the search exacts a heavy psychoanalytical toll on the
high sensation-seeker.2 6 4 The Prairie Indians that Margolin studied, especially the Utes, were acknowledged to suffer from an extraordinary incidence of pathological symptoms, in particular illness, neurosis, and accident proneness.2 6 Through interviews,
Margolin found a disproportionate number of the Prairie Indians
to be extremely aggressive and extremely high sensationseekers.2 66 Margolin believes this is a result of selection pressure
over centuries of their ancestors living lives that consisted almost
entirely of war and raids.2 67 The ordered conditions of the Prairie
Indians' modern life on their reservations, Margolin argues, offered far too little opportunity to discharge their aggression and
sensation-seeking.26 Margolin attributes the Indians' pathological symptoms to this repressed aggression and sensationseeking.2 6 9
Some may claim that the lost activities did not add that much
to the many recreational activities that remain available. They
can claim, for example, that people are skiing more than ever;
therefore, there is no reason to care whether ski areas feel driven
to groom every run. But those who take this view are looking at
skiing quantitatively without paying attention to how skiing's
profoundly aesthetic quality is diminished when every run is
groomed.
Others may claim that the modern playground-sanitized
through the taking of every precaution that a judge, jury, or liability insurer may deem cost-justified-represents an improvement over previous playgrounds. But many authorities in playground design sharply disagree.

264. LORENZ, supra note 244, at 240 (citing Sydney Margolin, Lecture at Menninger
School
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

of Psychiatry (1960)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id.
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Because local authorities fear accidents (and litigation), the playgrounds they make are dull. Though they may realize that children
are tireless explorers, they are not prepared to encourage them ....
It is a rewarding experience for children to take and overcome risks
and to learn to use lethal tools with safety. Life demands courage,
endurance and strength, but we continue to underestimate the capacity of children for taking risks, enjoying the stimulation of danger, and finding things out for themselves. It is often difficult to
permit children to take risks, but over-concern prevents them from
growing up. This is all too clearly seen in the dull, 'safe' playgrounds
that continue to be devised.27°

As previously discussed, judges and jurors often will not appreciate fully the extent to which the apparently innocuous precautions asked for by the plaintiff spoil the recreation. This full appreciation is not easily achieved.2 7 ' The judicial treatment of the
spectator injury cases, in which an errant baseball, hockey puck,
or tire wheel injure a spectator, illustrates the reluctance of many
courts to acknowledge the value of preserving the quality and appeal of play. 2 In the spectator's action against the stadium or
sports club, a frequent theory of negligence is that the defendant
should have screened off more of the seats, includingnaturally-the plaintiffs seat.2 73 One would think that the courts
would, at least occasionally, rule as a matter of law that the defendant was not negligent because a larger screen would have
impaired the enjoyment of watching the sport far too much. Instead, however, courts have searched for some other ground, such
as lack of duty or assumption of risk, on which to keep the spectator's case from reaching the jury.274
Simply because professionals have studied the play benefits of
various playground designs, unlike the play benefits of the other
recreational activities discussed here, literature exists suggesting

270. LADY ALLEN OF HURTWOOD, PLANNING FOR PLAY 16-17 (1968) (citations omitted).
271. The value of more enriching play may be one of those "abstract" values that, as
Professor Gerla has warned, judges and jurors applying the Learned Hand test for negligence will consistently undervalue. Harry S. Gerla, The "Reasonableness"Standard in the
Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their Due, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 205
(1990).
272. See, e.g., Enhardt v. Perry Stadium, Inc., 46 N.E.2d 704, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943);
Thurmond v. Prince William Profl Baseball Club, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 246, 248 (Va. 2003).
273. E.g., Thurmond, 574 S.E.2d at 248.
274. E.g., id. at 250 (holding "that as a matter of law, a spectator assumes the normal
risks of watching a baseball game, which includes the danger of being hit by a ball batted
into an unscreened spectator area").
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how easily liability-driven precautions can spoil play. Consider,
for instance, the precaution of removing loose materials like
wooden blocks, old car tires, and other discarded building materials from a playground area for pre-school and early elementary
school children. When this precaution would have avoided serious
injury to a child using the playground, would any judge or juror
fail to deem the precaution cost-justified? Yet many child psychologists insist that loose materials are an essential ingredient
for a successful playground:
Many playgrounds are most popular while they are under construction, when there are small bits of wood and mounds of earth all over
the place. When it is finished, the children's interest often wanes.
The playing equipment is soon explored, and planned play activities
are a diminishing enticement if the possibilities of variation are limited.
What is most often lacking in playgrounds ... is loose material
which will serve the child's inventive and creative drive. Everything
is normally so finished, so well-arranged that nothing is left to the
child's initiative. This275is a mistake; children want a part in creating
their own play world.

Similarly, many liability insurers are insisting as a condition of
coverage that newly constructed day-care centers install large
windows in their playrooms or take other precautions so that the
center's staff and the children are always visible.2 76 When this
precaution would have been inexpensive and would probably have
avoided a plaintiff child's abuse by the center's staff, a jury is
likely to deem the precaution cost-justified and thus the center's
failure to take it negligent.2 77 In such a case, how many defense
attorneys will even present evidence of how that precaution impairs the children's play? Yet child psychologists emphasize that
children, especially those in cities and towns, flourish best when
centers allow them to construct hiding places.
We are too concerned that every corner should be in full view ....
Must we really know everything, see everything and control everything in a child's life?... Anything capable of use as a hiding-place
can be desirable from a child's point of view.

275.

ARVID BENGTSSON, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING FOR CHILDREN'S PLAY 156 (1970).

276. See, e.g., Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
277. Id. at 855 (holding that the school's quick and effective response-installation of
windows in the classroom doors-was not 'clearly unreasonable,"' whereas failure to respond has been held unreasonable) (quoting Davis v. Manre County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 649 (1999)).
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As children, we have all discovered the cozy "room" under a welldraped table, where the tablecloth almost reaches the floor. The
to flourish best when the adult world is comchild's fantasy seems
27 8
pletely shut out.

A study of one experimental playground concluded:
The greatest amount of creativity, in terms of both frequency and
span, took place behind and in the playhouse. It is suggested that
one of the reasons for this was the sense of enclosure there .... Kids
the world over enjoy the feeling of secrecy and sharing it with a few
intimates. Through imaginative play they were quite able to turn a
far comer of the playhouse into a 'secret place,' even though every
kid on the playground knew the playhouses had a 'far comer.'
2 79 The
need is for the sense of privacy rather than physical isolation.

Some playground designers also echo the broader claim that
the risk of physical injury to oneself, while never desirable standing alone, is nevertheless an inseparable part of much enriching
recreation:
[Olne of the principal characteristics of play... [is] that it involves
risks. Children are designed by nature to take chances; their bodies
are resilient and able to take bumps and mend easily. Consider how
many times a child falls down in the process of learning to walk; that
same punishment would break bones in most adults' bodies.
Moreover, children have resilient bodies because they need to
take risks in order to explore their physical selves and to find out
what they can do. If this self-discovery is prevented, children are unable to recognize their own potentials. They won't develop confidence
in themselves, for they won't know where their centers of gravity
are, physically or psychologically. So the notion of safety must acpsychological
commodate risk if the intimate environment-the
280
health of children-is not to be threatened.

BENGTSSON, supra note 275, at 154.
279. Robin C. Moore, Dipl. Arch. University College, London, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of City and Regional Planning at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November, 1966 (on file with author).
278.

280.

JEREMY JOAN HEWES, BUILD YOUR OWN PLAYGROUND!: A SOURCEBOOK OF PLAY

SCULPTURES, DESIGNS, AND CONCEPTS FROM THE WORK OF JAY BECKWITH 10 (1974). Un-

fortunately, the notion that society should aim at preventing all accidental physical injury
to children has been gaining ground. Perhaps the ultimate expression of this notion was
the declaration in June 2001 by the British Medical Journal that it was banning the word
"accident" from its pages on the ground that all eventualities can be foreseen and measures taken to avoid adverse outcomes. Ronald M. Davis & Barry Pless, BMJ Bans "Accidents". "Accidents Are Not Unpredictable," 322 BRIT. MED. J. 1320, 1320-21 (2001). This
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Other playground designers emphasize that the wide range of
individual skills and individual desire for sensation require an
equally wide range of activities of varying difficulty and risk.
"Children and young people of all ages-like adults-should be
able to 'go shopping' for their play. They need a great variety of
activities. The essence of our provision for them must be to give
them freedom to choose."28 '
Sanitized playgrounds have become so widespread in the
United States that one may have difficulty imagining alternatives. But one need only look to Western Europe and Japan where
the liability expense of those designing and offering playgrounds
is dramatically less. There one sees over the last forty years the
spread of Adventure Playgrounds and One O'Clock Clubs. These
evolved out of what were descriptively called "waste material
playgrounds" which were little more than areas set aside where
82
children were allowed to play with old cars, boxes, and timber.
While the current versions differ from each other in so many
ways that no single description is possible, they all strive to let
children "do it themselves" and to give children many opportunities to test themselves against new challenges. They also share
the view toward risks and child development that was advanced
on behalf of Adventure Playgrounds more than twenty years ago:
It is too often forgotten that small children, like older children of
school age, need a place where they can develop self-reliance, where
they can test their limbs, their senses and their brain, so that brain,
limbs and senses gradually become obedient to their will. If, during
these early years, a child is deprived of the opportunity to educate
himself by trial and error, [and] by taking risks... , he may, in the
end, lose confidence in himself and lose his desire to become self-

declaration, far from representing an advance, extinguishes an essential difference between our mentality and that of the primitives. As Professors Douglas and Wildavsky
have written, the invention of the notion of a regular accident rate, like that of a natural
death or a normal incidence of disease, was a triumph for modern science. That was because primitive cultures attributed all physical injuries to human agency, usually behavior by members of the culture which broke some taboo. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 29-32 (1982).

281. LADY ALLEN OF HURTWOOD, supra note 270, at 17; see also Bob Huges, Play DeprivationPlay Bias and Playwork Practice, in PLAYWOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 71 (Fraser
Brown ed., 2002) ("[T]here is a deep impact on the human psyche if we cannot play, or if
the scope of our play is limited." (emphasis added)).
282.

C. TH. SORENSEN, OPEN SPACES FOR TowN AND COUNTRY (1931) (proposing the

idea). The first 'waste material playground' was opened at Emdrup, England in 1943. See
generally Tony Chilton, Adventure Playgrounds in the Twenty-first Century, in PLAYWORK:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 114-17 (Fraser Brown ed., 2002).
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reliant. Instead of learning security, he becomes fearful and withdrawn .... It is difficult for children to grow up emotionally stable
if
28 3
they are denied space and freedom to take and overcome risks.

This article does not contend there is any constitutional impediment to courts and legislatures regulating flow or high stimulation activities. After all, many crimes and much socially undesirable conduct can also provide the stimulation and, for that
matter, the developmental benefits of the recreational activities
in question. That Willie Sutton robbed banks and Leopold and
Loeb murdered Billy Stevens "for the thrill of it" or to test themselves may explain, but hardly justifies, their conduct. No one has
any constitutional "right" to engage in whatever recreational activities they favor. Nor need courts consider whether such criminal activities as racing cars on the public highway qualify as a
flow or a high stimulation activity before deeming that conduct
negligent.
Nevertheless, an important argument for regulating crimes
and other socially undesirable activity does not apply to the recreational activities in question. The activities in question incur
liability not because those activities endanger others, as crimes
generally do, but because of a paternalistic wish to protect the patrons themselves. And of course the patrons are being protected
not just from their choice to purchase the activity despite its risks
to them, but-because they have signed a release-from their further choice to do so without the background possibility of a negligence suit against the vendor. Upholding releases, as contended
for here, would in no way compromise societies' wish to regulate
activities which endanger people other than the patron and those
claiming through him. Others who are injured by the way the
vendor offers his activities-such as other boaters on the lake
who are injured by the way the vendor offers his water-skiing
rental-would be as able to recover by showing the vendor's negligence as they are now.
While the paternalistic wish to protect people from their
choices is clearly a constitutionally valid ground for regulation,
there is no reason that wish should drive tort law. A court that
overcomes a release and allows the patron to recover strips a patron of his capacity to bind himself not to sue in return for the

283.

LADY ALLEN OF HURTWOOD, supra note 270, at 14.
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vendor offering the activity. The court's decision demeans the patron and robs him of his choice. In place of the patron's choice
about whether the benefits of the activity outweigh the risk of injury to him, the court substitutes its own choice. Overcoming a release denigrates not just the activity but any right the patron had
to choose the activity. Professor Donald Judges has argued forcefully that courts should recognize a patron's right to choose the
level of risk from a recreational activity that he or his children
will encounter.2 " 4 He claims that making one's own choices about
the risks one will encounter is an important aspect of individual
autonomy.2 "5 Especially because individuals vary so much in the
amount of stimulation they wish, Judges argues, their choice of
the level of risks they will encounter, at least when the activity
28 6
does not endanger others, deserves respect:
In summary, the liberty to make one's own decisions about risk [to
one's self], in accordance with one's own character, is an important
component of both individual and social self-realization. In a society
based on mutual respect for each individual's freedom to define his
or her own terms of self-fulfillment and self-actualization, institutions that interfere
with risk choice ought to carry a high burden of
28 7
justification.

What Professor Judges terms the right of "risk choice" would not
be of constitutional dimension, but it should count heavily in favor of enforcing releases.28 8
Perhaps surprisingly, Professor Judges' right of risk choice resembles the increasingly recognized right of physically handicapped people to reasonable accommodation in the workplace.2 89
Both rights spring from a wish to increase the right-holder's
autonomy. Both reflect the judgment that an individual should
have the opportunity to prefer an active life with all its perils
over a passive but safer life. Indeed both seem to privilege the active life over the passive. Both seem to acknowledge that in order
to flourish, individuals must engage in satisfying activities. Both
lack any constitutional origin, at least as the Constitution has
284. Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY
L.J. 1, 26 (1993).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393-94 (2002) (discussing "reasonable accommodation" and its limits).
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thus far been interpreted. Both may reduce social welfare. Certainly society's cost of accommodating the wish of physically
handicapped people to work seems likely to exceed the benefit of
that work to society's welfare.2 9 ° Indeed when the costs of injury
to handicapped people and to others from including handicapped
people in the workplace is added to the other costs of accommodating handicapped people, one suspects society's welfare would
increase if this right was not recognized and if handicapped people were encouraged to stay at home.2 9 ' While less certain, it is
possible that the recreational activities which have disappeared
were also unable to pay their way. If that is so, society's decision
to accept a welfare loss in order to help handicapped people lead a
fuller life provides a precedent for accepting a welfare loss in order to preserve the risk choice of sportsmen. Moreover, the tort
rules which allow the physically handicapped to prevail in an action against them for negligence, even though their behavior
would be deemed negligent were they not handicapped, provide a
precedent for restricting liability for negligence in order to encourage an active life.292
The recreational activities could also be compared to dangerous
employment. Because worker's compensation laws ban negligence
actions against employers, many jobs remain available that
would likely be too dangerous to pay their way in the absence of
that ban. Worker's compensation laws reflect a societal judgment
to preserve these jobs nonetheless. That judgment may stem from
the legislatures' recognition that employment itself carries with it

290. Because a disproportionate number of handicapped people work at the minimum
wage, the contribution of their work to society's wealth is probably modest. Moreover, from
the perspective of handicapped people, their purely financial gain from working will often
be modest as well. My point is that the psychological and emotional benefits of an active
life must be considerable for, say, the blind to venture out or for society to want them to
venture out.
291. Legislative limits on tort liability are often imposed to preserve an activity that
could not "pay its way" because of the many injuries and tort suits it would engender. An
example would be the legislative bans on liability for transfusions of contaminated blood.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-28 (2000).
292. Most states hold physically handicapped people who are sued for injuring others
to the lower standard of the ordinary care of a person with their handicap, not to the standard of the ordinary care of a reasonable person. The natural result is that those who are
injured by handicapped people will have more difficulty showing negligence and will be
less likely to recover. See, e.g., Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 N.W.2d
778, 787 (Neb. 1996) (holding that "[o]ne who is ill must conform to the standard of a reasonable person under like disability .. " (quoting Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 530
(Neb. 1994)).
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emotional and psychological benefits which help a worker lead a
fuller life. And the method of preserving these jobs with their
benefits, like the method proposed here for preserving recreational activities, is to eliminate the negligence action that would
increase the cost of offering the jobs lest that cost reach the point
where offering the jobs is no longer profitable.
The value of the activities in question, therefore, warrants
some sadness at their passing. The modern traveler will never
know the rush from ending a hot day on the road with that first
dive into a motel pool, nor the tonic throughout the day from the
anticipation of that dive. Nor will many horse-lovers know the
challenge of controlling an unfamiliar horse on a trail unaccompanied, nor the serenity of the ride, nor the communion with the
horse once that challenge is met. Nor will skiers know the invitation to audacity, nor the balm to high spirits, offered by an ungroomed slope. The loss of these activities has left society a duller
place for all.
This section has surveyed the many benefits of the activities. It
has pointed out that the tort liability which raises the activities'
costs discriminates against identifiable sections of society and
tends to drive those discriminated against to less desirable substitutes. It has suggested some of the less obvious ways in which
proposed safety measures destroy the benefits of recreational activities. Finally, it has argued that imposing liability on negligent
vendors in the face of a release accords too little respect to the patron's autonomy.
IV. THE PROPOSED RULE
A. Explanation of the Rule
"There is always a certain risk in being alive, and if you are
more alive, there is more risk."
Ibsen
Bemoaning the disappearance of activities that give joy is one
thing. Crafting a defensible and workable rule of law that will
preserve these activities without unduly sacrificing the other
goals of torts is another. Like all rules, the rule proposed hereenforce the release unless the court finds that the vendor's con-
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duct as alleged was outrageous or that the injury occurred in a
context where patrons generally lack any significant opportunity
for self-protection-requires some intellectual labor to apply and
yields results at the margin that seem difficult to defend. The
rule's merits turn on the extent to which it holds the sum of these
decision-making and error costs to a minimum. This subsection
explains how the rule would apply to recreational activities while
reserving most of the defense of the rule to the following subsection.
As explained in the Introduction,29 3 the rule comes into play
when the defendant vendor moves before trial to enforce the release and thereby to dismiss the case on the pleadings or on
summary judgment. The rule calls on the court, after interpreting
the release, to assess two matters in deciding whether to enforce
the release as interpreted. First, the court should find whether
the plaintiff patron's injury occurred in a context where patrons
generally lack any significant opportunity for self-protection. Second, the court should find whether defendant's behavior, as alleged in plaintiffs complaint or as subsequently stipulated by the
parties, rises to the level of outrageous. An affirmative finding on
one of these matters would eliminate any need to undertake the
other and would result in the case proceeding as if the release
had been deemed unenforceable. Through a motion to dismiss at
the close of plaintiffs evidence or at the close of all evidence, the
defendant could again move for a negative finding on both matters and a consequent dismissal. Should a case reach the jury, the
proposed rule will not affect the jury instructions or the jury deliberations. To be sure, because outrageous here means outrageous in regard to safety, a court finding at the close of all the
evidence finds that the release was unenforceable because the
vendor's conduct was outrageous will logically find that the vendor's conduct was also negligent as a matter of law. Such a finding may leave to the jury only the remaining elements such as
cause-in-fact, proximate cause, damages, and the elements of the
vendor's contributory negligence defense as well as, in an appropriate case, the apportionment of culpability or causality called
for by the jurisdiction's comparative negligence rule. Of course, a
judicial finding that the vendor's behavior was outrageous is fully
consistent with a jury verdict for the vendor whenever the jury

293.

See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
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could have resolved one of these remaining matters in the vendor's favor.
One challenge to courts will be identifying those relatively rare
recreational contexts in which the patron lacks significant opportunity for self-protection. As indicated, the release would be
deemed unenforceable in these contexts. Examples include the
skier on the chair lift who is injured because the lift collapses; the
sky-diver who is killed because his parachute, packed by the defendant sky-diving vendor, failed to open upon the sky-diver
properly deploying them; the bungee jumper injured because the
vendor's line breaks; the scuba diver injured because the pressurized air purchased from the vendor dive shop turns out to be contaminated; or the amusement park patron injured because the
park's ride flies off its track. Further examples include the renter
of a water-skiing boat who is injured when the tow line breaks;
the diver injured when the vendor's diving board breaks or comes
off its fulcrum; or the renter of time on a trampoline or mechanized bull who is injured when the trampoline rips or the "bull"
comes off its base.2 94 To be sure, as in almost any accident, the patron injured in these contexts could improve his chances of avoiding injury, or at least of mitigating his injury, by maintaining his
fitness. But in these contexts there is no amount of care or preparation on the patron's part which can protect him from the accident itself. Moreover, no one would claim that the challenge to
the patron of protecting himself against these risks is an inseparable and often desirable part of the recreational experience.
In contrast, patrons of recreational activities often operate in a
context where the risk of injury to the patron can be patroninfluenced, if not patron-controlled, to a much more significant
extent. Skiers, for example, retain ample opportunity for selfprotection while on the slopes. Their decisions about how and
where to ski, heavily influence the risks they will encounter. Indeed, part of what a skier buys from a ski area is a chance to see
if he can, and a chance to show that he can, protect himself while
skiing as he wishes. Part of the skiing experience is the skier's
opportunity to anticipate and protect himself against the hazards

294. Steven Shavell would deem these accidents "unilateral." SHAVELL, supra note 69,
at 21-26; William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner would deem these situations "alternative care" situations. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 60-61. Both argue that the

utilitarian case for liability is especially strong in these accidents or situations.
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of the ski area, including those hazards for which some modern
courts have deemed the ski area negligent.295 This is not to say
that the skier injured by such a hazard should blame himself or is
in any way negligent, nor that the ski area was not negligent or
did not increase the risk to the skier. The goal of the proposed
rule is not to assess fault, but to identify contexts where the patron's promise not to sue the vendor for negligence should be respected. Skiers also retain significant opportunity for selfprotection against the risks presented by the normal operation of
chair lifts, t-bars, and rope tows, even though that normal operation would include the commonplace starts and stops and reactions to fallen skiers for which the ski area could be deemed negligent. Still one can imagine t-bar, o-bar, and rope tow accidents
which are analogous to a collapsing chair lift in that the skier
lacked any opportunity for self-protection.
It may be harder to imagine horse-riding contexts in which the
patron-rider so lacked the opportunity for self-protection that the
patron's release of the vendor stable would not be enforced. The
rider's opportunity to control or at least to influence the horse so
as to avoid injury to himself is a central and ubiquitous feature of
the horse-riding experience. In accidents that are at all attributable to the horse's behavior, the rider's opportunity for selfprotection through control over the horse exists almost by definition.296 That the stable's negligence in choice of horse or choice of
route or in letting the rider take the horse unaccompanied may
have increased the difficulty or importance of the rider controlling
the horse should be irrelevant as long as that opportunity for control remains for riders generally. Indeed, the difficulty or importance of the rider controlling the horse may be what makes the
recreational experience enjoyable.
For many recreational activities, determining whether the patron enjoyed a significant opportunity for self-protection in the
context at hand should be straightforward. As mentioned above,

295. See, e.g., Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 401 (Vt. 1978) (holding that a ski
area was negligent for not discovering and marking a clump of brush on a ski trail).
296. This is likewise the case in the bicycling context. For instance a bicyclist during a
bicycle race retains a significant opportunity for self-protection against car drivers who
wrongly enter the course. Hence the cyclist could not sue the organization offering the
race, although the release would not be relevant to his action against the car driver. For
the opposite result on these facts, see Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation, 239
Cal. Rptr. 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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sky-diving vendors could not enforce the release when the parachutes they packed failed to open. On the other hand, in landing
accidents after a parachute does open, the sky-diver's ability to
adjust the direction he is blown and the direction he faces by pulling on his straps, while far from perfect, combined with his ability
to adjust his posture on descent so as to strike the ground at a
safer angle, provide sufficient scope for self-protection that releases should be routinely enforced. Releases should be enforced
without difficulty in almost all contexts involving swimming and
diving, water-skiing, the use of trampolines, mechanical bulls,
and playground equipment. Wilderness trekkers, rock climbers,
and rafters generally retain sufficient opportunity for selfprotection throughout their activity that releases of guides or instructors should be enforced.
An important feature of any tort rule is the level of generality
at which it is to be applied. Is the court to determine case by case
whether the particular patron under the peculiar facts of that
case had significant opportunity to protect himself? When the
rule is applied at that low level of generality, which might be
called the case by case level, a good deal of fact-finding may be
needed, and the resolution of the issue in one case will have little
importance as precedent in subsequent cases. Or is the court to
determine in sweeping fashion, for example, that patrons have a
significant opportunity for self-protection in all horse-riding
cases, with the result that releases in all horse-riding cases will
be enforced? If so, one could call the very high level of generality
at which the rule is to be applied the activity by activity level. Because the proposed rule is ordinarily to be applied on the pleadings, it must be applied at a relatively high level of generality.
Application at the case by case level will so subject vendors to the
expense of discovery as to threaten the goal of preserving the
availability of the recreational activity. Moreover, the pleadings
should provide enough information about the case so that the
court need not apply the rule at a level of generality quite so high
as activity by activity. Rather, the proposed rule is to be applied
at the level of generality that has been called here context by context. For example, as explained above, skiing accidents from a lift
collapse occur in a different context than skiing accidents while
on the slopes. Once a court determines from the pleadings that
the case before it involves, say, a patron's accident while on the
slopes, the court need not inquire further about the extent to
which the risk that materialized in that particular case was pa-
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tron-influenced. Admittedly there are sure to be cases where the
pleadings do not reveal whether patrons generally can protect
themselves in the context before the court. In these cases further
inquiry will be needed.2 97
Patrons injured while riding amusement park or carnival rides
seem to lack a significant opportunity for self-protection. An activity where patrons sit passively under constraint is hardly a patron-influenced activity; indeed amusement park rides may seem
the antithesis of the patron-influenced activities that are the focus of this article. And when patrons are injured by a ride's malfunction, releases on behalf of the amusement park or carnival
should be ignored.29
Occasionally, however, patrons sue amusement parks when
rides function normally but injure a small percentage of patrons
nevertheless. An example would be a roller coaster or bungee
jump whose normal and intended operation causes an occasional
patron emotional distress, nausea, soreness of the neck, or
bruises.2 9 9 Here, releases should be enforced even though the patron lacks any opportunity for self-protection during the ride. One
could explain this on the ground that in these situations the patron's opportunity to protect himself by observing the normal operation of the ride and by declining to purchase rides whose ordinary operation endanger him should be deemed significant.
Invariably in these cases the patron or his parents observed the
ride's normal and intended operation before purchasing it. That
ability gave the patron or his parents an opportunity to evaluate
the risk from the ride's normal and intended operation in light of
what is surely the most important factor bearing on that riskthe patron's particular emotional and physical condition and susceptibility to injury. Granted, the vendor whose ride has malfunctioned, like the amusement park whose roller coaster leaves its

297. Again, this is not an inquiry into the fault of the patron. Some facts relevant to the
extent of potential patron influence, however, will also be relevant to fault. Examples
would include the duration of the ride, the role played by forces under the patron's influence, like the horse itself, and the extent of patron forewarning.
298. By analogy, releases should also be ignored in product liability actions which arise
from a product's malfunction. For example, the risks that a diving board will break or
come off its fulcrum are not patron-influenced risks and no release by the injured patron
would be relevant in his product liability actions or his actions for negligent installation or
maintenance.
299. See, e.g., Beroutsos v. Six Flags Theme Park, Inc., 713 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (alleging neck and back injuries caused by riding a roller coaster).
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tracks, could make this same argument in order to enforce the release against injured patrons who had witnessed previous malfunctions. Those patrons too, the amusement park could argue,
were equally able to protect themselves by declining to purchase
the ride. Elevating the patron's obvious ability to decline purchase into a significant opportunity for self-protection against
some injuries from rides but not against others, the amusement
park could protest, is simply arbitrary. The difference is that the
risk of injury from a ride's malfunction, unlike the risk of injury
from the ride's normal and intended operation, does not turn so
heavily on the individual patron's personal susceptibility to injury
and hence is not a risk that the individual patron or his parents
is far better able to evaluate than the vendor is. Hence there is
more reason to view the ability not to buy as an opportunity for
self-protection, and thus to enforce a release, when the patron's
injuries stem from the activity's normal operation than when the
injuries stem from the activity's malfunction. When a patron
knows of his susceptibility to injury from what he observes to be
the normal operation of the ride-knowledge about himself which
the patron acquires. simply from living-the simple precaution of
declining to purchase the ride is a precaution worth encouraging.
A key feature of the proposed rule is the absence of any need
for a court to consider the particular patron's state of mind and,
in particular, his knowledge and appreciation of the risk that materialized. This feature distinguishes the proposed rule from the
many versions of the assumption of risk defense. °° Decades of
experience with assumption of risk have demonstrated the shortcomings of any test that turns in part on whether a plaintiff knew
and appreciated the risk." 1 The problem is not just the severe invitation to perjury inherent in a test which turns heavily on a
plaintiffs own claims about his lack of knowledge, especially
when those claims are not likely to be contradicted by documents

300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b (1965) (stating that the assumption of risk defense turns on a plaintiffs knowledge and appreciation of the risks he
would encounter). The versions of assumption of risk include express, implied, primary,
secondary, reasonable, and unreasonable. Leslie Hastings, Comment, Playing with Liability: The Risk Release in High Risk Sports, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 127, 155-56 (1988).
301. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706 (Cal. 1992) (recognizing the inherent difficulties and shortcomings of an inquiry into a plaintiffs subjective expectations regarding
assumption of risk). From the vendor's perspective, another disadvantage of the assumption of risk defense is that it was rarely available when patrons were children.
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or other available evidence." 2 An equally serious problem comes
from uncertainty about what dimensions of risk are relevant.
Does risk mean simply the chance of injury and the severity of injury should it occur? Or must a plaintiff also know and appreciate
the type of risk and the manner of risk, meaning the manner or
method by which his injury came about? If so, any plaintiff can
advance some plausible claim that he did not know or appreciate
some dimension of the risk that materialized. Unfortunately, the
use of the word "opportunity" in the proposed rule is sure to trigger the reply that a patron does not have a meaningful opportunity to protect himself from risks he does not know and appreciate. This reply misconceives the inquiry. The inquiry is not about
the fault of the individual patron nor is it much about the individual patron at all. The inquiry is about identifying recreational
contexts where the advantages of enforcing releases generally
outweigh the disadvantages.
Once the court determines that the injury occurred in a context
which affords the patron significant opportunity for selfprotection, the enforceability of a release then turns on whether
the alleged behavior of the vendor was outrageous. While regrettably open-ended, the concept of outrageous behavior is not as
open-ended as it might appear. Because outrageous behavior is
the central element in the tort of infliction of emotional distress,
courts have been applying and providing content to the concept of
outrageous behavior for more than half a century. 33 Judicial experience with the emotional distress tort has answered many
questions about outrageous behavior, and those answers can
guide courts in identifying outrageous behavior here. Courts have
determined that outrageous behavior can be committed with no
intent to injure others but merely with disregard toward the possibility of injury to others2 °4 Courts have further determined that
the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff is a legitimate factor in assessing whether the defendant's behavior was
outrageous. For instance, a psychiatrist's behavior in having con302. See id.
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
304. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate, 20 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1945) (concluding
that "[a] willful wrong may be committed without any intention to injure anyone"); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (stating that "[olne who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm").
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sensual sex with his patient has been widely deemed outrageous
even though that behavior would not be viewed as culpable in the
absence of the psychiatrist-patient relationship."' Hence courts
could deem a vendor's behavior toward a patron outrageous without any fear of that ruling creating a precedent outside of the
vendor-patron relationship. Courts have further determined that
for behavior to be outrageous it must be more culpable than mere
negligence. 0 6 To be sure, behavior that is outrageous in light of
the risk of causing another person emotional distress likely differs from behavior outrageous in light of the risk of causing
physical injury to another person.
Historically, the words used to describe behavior more unreasonably dangerous than negligence have been "willful and wanton" and "reckless." Were it not for an occasional court decision
construing those words so broadly that they are all but synonyms
for negligence, 0 7 the proposed rule would incorporate those
terms. In Knight v. Jewett,"' the California Supreme Court described the conduct that would render one participant in a recreational activity liable to an injured fellow participant as "conduct
that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary [conduct] involved in the sport."30 9 That test gives further
definition to what is meant by outrageous vendor conduct here.

305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) cmt. e (1965) (stating that "[tihe
extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a
position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over
the other, or power to affect his interests"). A number of states have enacted statutes making therapist-patient consensual sexual contact a criminal offense. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.345(h)(ii) (West Supp. 2003).
306. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 712 F. Supp. 556, 565 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (stating that for conduct to surpass mere negligence and be regarded as atrocious it
must be "outrageous in character, extreme in degree and [go] beyond all bounds of decency").
307. See, e.g., Rost v. United States, 803 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1986) (construing California's test of willful or wanton behavior to mean virtually the same as negligence).
308. 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992).
309. Id. at 711.
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B. Defense of the ProposedRule
"At lilac evening I walked. . , feeling that the best the white
world had offered was not enough ecstasy for me, not enough life,
joy, kicks...."
Jack Kerouac
Why should the enforcement of a release turn so heavily on
whether patrons in the context at hand generally possess a significant opportunity for self-protection? Why this emphasis on
whether the risks to patrons in that context are generally patroncontrolled or at least patron-influenced? And how can one defend
a rule calling on courts to decide whether to enforce a release at
the context by context level of generality rather than the case by
case level?
First, the Tunkl criteria for enforcing releases expressly identifies a plaintiffs opportunity for self-protection as an important
factor favoring enforcement. Tunkl announced six characteristics
of releases and of their accompanying transactions that call for
refusing enforcement.3 1 ° The sixth is that "as a result of the
transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by
the seller or his agents."" That the purchaser was not under the

310. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444-46 (Cal. 1963).
311. Id. at 446. Many courts which have enforced releases in the recreational context
have pointed out that three of the other four Tunkl characteristics, which call for voiding
releases, are likewise absent in recreational contexts. The first of the absent characteristics is that the "party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members
of the public." Id. at 445. The second absent characteristic is that "[als a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services." Id. at 445-46. The third absent characteristic is that the release "concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation." Id. at 445. While the first two are absent in virtually all recreational contexts,
the third will be absent only in some. The only one of the six characteristics that is clearly
present in the recreational context is that "the party [seeking exculpation] holds himself
out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least
for any member coming within certain established standards." Id.
Whether the remaining characteristic is present depends on one's interpretation of it:
"In exercising a superior bargaining power the party [seeking exculpatation] confronts the
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against
negligence." Id. at 446. Since Tunkl was decided, scholars have pointed out that "adhesion
contracts" serve many useful functions and do not deserve the harsh treatment courts
have accorded them. See POSNER, supra note 83, at 114-16 (noting that adhesion contracts
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control of the seller but had retained significant opportunity for
self-protection at the time of the injury, the opinion in Tunkl
clearly implied, argues strongly for enforcing the release. In the
surgery context at issue in Tunkl, the plaintiff-patients were
typically unconscious or under medication at the time of the injury." 2 Their usual lack of opportunity to protect themselves contrasts sharply with the patrons' opportunity for self-protection in
the recreational contexts discussed here. Perhaps most importantly, the courts applying the Tunkl standards for enforcing releases have understood it to call for resolving the enforcement issue context by context. For example, the Tunkl decision has been
understood to invalidate all releases given by patients to their
surgeons for negligence during surgery, with the result that no
surgeon would be able to enforce a release by showing, for example, that his particular patient retained some opportunity to protect himself. This relatively high level of generality has enabled
courts to decide whether to enforce releases before trial.
Long before Tunkl, the inability of plaintiff passengers on railroads, buses, and street cars to protect themselves from traffic accidents played a major role in leading common law courts to establish the common carrier doctrine.3 13 That doctrine, when it
existed, not only nullified any release on behalf of the defendant
common carrier when sued by a passenger for a traffic injury, it
also held the common carrier to a higher degree of care than the
usual standard of ordinary care.3" 4 In clear, albeit implicit, recognition of the importance of a plaintiffs opportunity for selfprotection, courts in the pre-1960s era held that ski areas were
common carriers when sued by patrons injured while using a
chairlift," ' but not when sued by patrons injured while using a
tow rope.316 Again, the decision whether to deem the defendant a

avoid the cost of negotiating and drafting a separate agreement with each buyer). Other
scholars have attacked the notion of unequal bargaining power. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 623 (1982) (stating that the concept of unequal bargaining power may be internally incoherent).
312. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442 n.1.
313. See, e.g., Hauser v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 219 N.W. 60, 61 (Iowa 1928) (establishing the common carrier doctrine).
314. Id.
315. Fisher v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 283 F.2d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that a chairlift is a common carrier and finding the defendant ski resort negligent for failing to assist
the plaintiff out of the chair).
316. McDaniel v. Dowell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that
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common carrier was made at a higher level of generality than
case by case.3 17 In other words, a defendant could not avoid being
deemed a common carrier by pointing out that the particular
plaintiff-passenger happened to retain significant opportunity for
self-protection even though most persons in the plaintiffs position
would not.318 The level of generality courts employed in deeming a
defendant a common carrier matches the context by context level
of generality courts should employ in applying the proposed rule.
Courts have recognized that a plaintiffs opportunity to protect
himself bears on a number of legal issues which judges in tort
suits are regularly called upon to resolve. One such issue in negligence suits is widely called the duty issue, namely whether the
defendant has any duty of care toward the plaintiff.319 While duty
issues turn on a wide variety of policy concerns, those concerns
often include whether persons in plaintiffs position retain ample
opportunity to protect themselves. The better the plaintiffs opportunity to protect himself, the stronger the case for resolving
the duty issue in the defendant's favor. 32" Another issue for the
court is whether those engaging in the defendant's activity should
be subject to strict liability rather than held liable only on proof of
negligence.3 2 ' On this issue as well, courts have recognized the
relevance of whether most persons in the plaintiffs position can
take steps to protect themselves against the risks from defendant's activity.32 2 Again, the better the plaintiffs opportunity for

a tow rope is not a common carrier, and therefore, defendant ski resort did not owe the
plaintiff a duty of utmost care and diligence).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See generally, Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
41 (1934) (discussing the meaning of duty in the context of tortious negligence and
whether the idea serves any useful function).
320. See, e.g., Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 756, 762 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (finding that the defendant had no duty to install a fence to protect tenants
when tenants have ample opportunity to protect themselves); Cygielman v. City of New
York, 402 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (finding that the defendant city has no
duty of care to maintain sidewalks for the benefit of skateboarders partly because skateboarders have ample opportunity to protect themselves from defects in the sidewalk).
321. See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D.
Colo. 1981) (finding that the storage of gasoline near a residential location was subject to
strict liability).
322. Many scholars have recognized the extent to which the victim's opportunity for
self-protection argues against imposing strict liability, but none more so than Professor
Mark Grady. See MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 90-95 (1994) (comparing strict liability and negligence cases).
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self-protection, the stronger the defendant's case against imposing strict liability.32 3 And on the issue of whether the defendant's
activity should be deemed a private nuisance, the usual ability of
persons in the plaintiffs position to protect themselves against
the interference from the defendant's activity is, by consensus, a
critical consideration.3 24 The proposed rule's emphasis on a plaintiffs opportunity for self-protection, then, draws support from
both the prior law concerning whether to enforce a release and,
more generally, from the prior law concerning whether liability is
in the best interests of society.
When a court decides a private nuisance case in a defendant's
favor on the grounds that those in the plaintiffs position have
ample opportunity for self-protection, the court is not attributing
the plaintiffs loss of his case to the plaintiffs fault. Just so, enforcing a release on the same ground in no way suggests that the
patron was at fault. The reasons for enforcing a release when the
patron had ample opportunity for self-protection lie elsewhere.
A major utilitarian reason supporting the proposed rule is that
the existence of the patron's opportunity for self-protection rules
out the possibility that the accident in question was a unilateral
accident which could only be prevented by the vendor taking
care.3 25 Professor Shavell has demonstrated that in such unilateral accidents the argument for liability is especially strong because there is no social gain from the legal creation of incentives
for patron precaution-taking. 326 Not coincidentally, the contexts in
which the proposed rule would void the release provide excellent
examples of such unilateral accidents. The collapsing chair lift
that injures a skier and the contaminated air that poisons a
scuba diver can only be prevented by the vendor taking carenothing is gained by creating incentives for the skier or scuba
diver to take care. In contrast, when the patron has a significant
opportunity to protect himself, social welfare calls for maintain-

323. Id.
324. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 62-63 (1979) (discussing private nuisance).
325. Accidents are deemed unilateral when they are most efficiently avoided by only
one party taking care or lowering his activity level. Accidents which are most efficiently
avoided by more than one party taking care or lowering their activity levels are deemed
bilateral. SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 6-10. Landes and Posner use the terms "alternative
care situations" and "joint care situations." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 60-61.
326. SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 6-10.
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ing incentives for the patron to seize his opportunity by taking
appropriate precautions. Enforcing the release whenever the patron's opportunity to protect himself exists is a rule well suited
for this purpose. The rule takes full advantage of the patron's
natural incentive to avoid injuring himself-avoiding the possible
dilution of the incentive which would result from giving the patron the prospect of a tort recovery should the patron be injured.
Now that comparative negligence has triumphed, that prospect of
a tort recovery will exist for all patrons, however recklessly they
plan to endanger themselves, if the release is ignored.
Admittedly, the notion that the prospect of tort recovery will
lead a potential accident victim to forego cost-justified precautions to protect himself may not seem consistent with the way
most individuals reason. That tort law may influence victim precaution-taking at the margin seems more plausible if one dispenses with imagining how an individual reasons and looks instead at how an assembly of individuals behave. Consider two
states alike in every respect except that the first bars any tort recovery for traffic injuries by a person who was not wearing his
seat belt when the injury occurred, and the second treats the failure to wear a seat belt just as any victim fault is treated under a
comparative negligence regime. Would we now confidently dismiss the possibility of more widespread and consistent use of seat
belts in the first state?
Another utilitarian reason supporting the proposed rule is that
patrons who possess a significant opportunity for self-protection
will often be able to avoid the injury to themselves at a lower cost
than the vendor can.3 2 7 There are a couple of reasons for suspecting that patron precautions are cheaper than vendor precautions.
First, vendor precautions are more likely to carry the heavy cost
of impairing the recreational benefits of the activity for other patrons. For instance, a skier may reduce the risk of injury from
skiing an ungroomed slope by slowing down and not proceeding
until he can see what lies ahead. But the ski area's only precaution may be to groom the slope, a precaution that further impairs
the aesthetic and other benefits of skiing. Second, the patron will
often derive satisfaction from preserving his safety through his
own precautions rather than through the precautions of vendors.

327. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970).
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Navigating an ungroomed slope without injury can be a challenge
and meeting that challenge a source of satisfaction. This extra
satisfaction can be viewed as either increasing the benefit from
the use of the patron's own precautions or as decreasing the cost
of those precautions. A substantial law and economics literature
maintains that social welfare would increase if courts fashioned
rules of law by denying liability in contexts where a plaintiff is
likely the cheapest precaution-taker.32 By maintaining incentives
for plaintiffs to protect themselves when the plaintiffs are the
cheaper precaution-takers, the law helps to minimize the social
costs of accidents.3 29 In such instances, pressuring the vendor to
idiot-proof his activities substitutes the less efficient method of
accident prevention for the more efficient method of patron care.
Admittedly, the patron's possession of an opportunity for selfprotection does not guarantee that the patron can take precautions against injury more cheaply than the vendor can. The administrative difficulties of any rule which requires a court to
identify the cheaper precaution-taker are prohibitive. Thus, the
proposed rule cannot be defended on the ground that a patron
with an opportunity for self-protection will always be the cheaper
precaution-taker.
But there is a utilitarian reason to enforce the release even if
the vendor is the cheaper precaution-taker. When the vendor's
negligence precedes the patron's opportunity to protect himself,
the patron will often be able to alter his behavior through a costjustified precaution that adjusts to or makes allowances for the
vendor's previous negligence. A skier can typically adjust his skiing to accommodate any previous negligence by the ski area in
failing to eliminate natural hazards on the slopes. Likewise a
horse rider can adjust his riding to accommodate any earlier negligence by the stable in selecting an obstacle-ridden trail. A water
skier can adjust for the vendor's negligence in renting the boat on
a lake that was too crowded or in providing a motor that was too
powerful. Because of the sequential nature of the parties' opportunities to take precautions, the patron will have the last clear
chance to avoid the accident. In such cases an efficient law would
want to avoid diluting the patron's incentive to take that last
clear cost-justified precaution. That wish calls for enforcing the

328.
329.

See id.
See id.
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release, lest the patron, on realizing the vendor's earlier negligence and hence his own prospect for a tort recovery should he be
injured, relax his care and reject his last clear chance to protect
himself.33 ° The utilitarian case for the pro-plaintiff last clear
chance rule rested on just such reasoning. In the days when any
plaintiffs contributory negligence barred liability, the last clear
chance rule allowed the plaintiff to recover, despite his negligence, when the defendant was shown to have the last clear
chance of avoiding the accident.3 3 1 For example, the last clear
chance rule allowed a car driver who was negligently stranded in
the wrong lane to recover against a driver who crashed into him
by showing that the defendant driver negligently failed to avoid
the accident after seeing him stranded and vulnerable.3 3 2 The notion was that the defendant driver had, and negligently lost, the
last clear chance to avoid the accident.3 33 The utilitarian goal of
the rule was to pressure the defendant to use his last clear chance
to avoid the accident.33 4 Without the last clear chance rule, a defendant might reason that the plaintiffs earlier contributory negligence relieved it of any need to be careful.
When risks are patron-controlled, or at least patron-influenced,
and substantial enough so that rational ignorance is not the patron's best response to them, the law should encourage patrons at
least to consider learning about, and preparing against, those
risks. In the activities in question, novice patrons suffer a disproportionate percentage of injuries suggesting that the safety benefits of advance preparation, or, what amounts to the same thing,
delaying participation until one undertakes advance preparation,
may justify the costs.3 3 5 Examples of advance preparation to protect oneself would include simply reading about how to reduce the
activity's risks or beginning an exercise regimen appropriate for
the activity. Yet under the current law, the injured patron's failure to prepare in advance to protect himself is never held against
him. This is because delaying participation until one has pre-

330. POSNER, supra note 83, at 177.
331. See Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Ellzey, 275 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1927) (discussing the last
clear chance doctrine).
332. See, e.g., Hanson v. N.H. Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc., 268 A.2d 841, 843-44 (N.H.
1970).
333. Id.
334. See Ellzey, 275 U.S. at 240.
335. See Sobo, supra note 2, at 199 (discussing the "open and obvious danger defense").
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pared in advance is an example of a reduction in activity level
and, as others have pointed out, the current contributory negligence defense, even when a total bar to recovery, does not create
any incentive for a plaintiff to reduce his activity level.336 The
proposed rule, in contrast, encourages advance preparation. The
proposed rule implicitly signals patrons who contemplate signing
a release to prepare for the risks of the activity in advance so they
will be able to take advantage of their opportunities to protect
themselves.
Encouraging patrons to develop the ability to protect themselves, as the proposed rule does, may yield other benefits as well.
While no one claims patrons should disregard the safety instructions of vendors, there is surprising evidence that safety improves
when patrons accept responsibility for their safety rather than
depending on the vendor.3 37 Experienced guides for advanced
mountain-climbing and rock-climbing expeditions, where one
might think utter dependence on guides would be appropriate,
stress that the safety of patrons improves when they assume personal responsibility for their own safety and treat the guide as
merely an experienced fellow climber offering advice.33 Putting
aside safety and other utilitarian goals, one can also see some social value in fostering the independence and self-confidence that
come from learning to protect oneself.
Naturally, the principle of freedom of contract and the arguments for that principle support enforcing releases generally. The
principle does not defend the proposed rule particularly well because it calls for enforcing the release even when the patron is injured in a context where he lacks opportunity for selfprotection.3 39 Nevertheless one could claim the arguments for
freedom of contract apply with special force when the patron at
the time of his injury had a significant opportunity to protect
himself. The release could then be viewed as a choice by the pa336. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 73-79 (arguing that a rule of negligence even
when combined with the contributory negligence defense does not create any incentive for
plaintiffs to reduce their activity level).
337. Jerry Beilinson, Professional Help, SKIING MAG., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 15-31 (quoting guides Doug Coombs and Lou Kasischke on the importance of patrons questioning
guides and taking responsibility for their own safety).

338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Enos v. Key Pharm., Inc., 106 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1997) (enforcing a
general release in a medical case where a child suffered brain damage from asthma medicine).
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tron and the vendor to handle the risks of injury to the patron
through patron rather than vendor precaution-taking whenever
the patron is in a position to take precautions.
To be sure, it is not obvious why a rational patron would ever
sign a release. After all, under the economic interpretation of the
Learned Hand test for negligence, the vendor would only be negligent if it omitted a cost-justified precaution, meaning a precaution whose safety payoff to the patron exceeded the vendor's cost
of taking the precaution.3 4 0 Hence, in theory both the patron and
vendor would be better off ex ante if the vendor took all such precautions and thereby avoided negligence. Moreover, as others
have shown, allowing negligence principles to apply-the result
when the release is not enforced-should, in theory, lead to optimal precaution-taking in all instances.3 4 1
Nevertheless the choice by the parties to substitute the patron's precautions for the vendor's can be rational. When patrons
have an opportunity for self-protection, the parties may distrust
the judge's and jury's estimate of whether vendor and patron precautions are cost-justified. The parties may fear the judge and
jury will find that vendor precautions are cost-justified when they
are not or that patron precautions are not cost-justified when
they are. The parties may believe, for example, that patron precautions will eliminate any need for vendor precautions, or at
least will so reduce the safety gain from the vendor precautions
that those precautions are no longer cost-justified. Or the parties
may believe that the patron will derive satisfaction from taking
his precautions, rendering those patron precautions less costly
and more likely cost-justified.3 42 In short, the parties may have
reason to prefer their own estimates of whose precautions are
cost-justified to the judicial estimate. That preference provides a
rational ground for agreeing to the release.

340. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
341. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 75-79.
342. That a patron derives satisfaction from seizing his opportunities for self-protection
does not mean the patron is generally risk-preferring. One who prefers the risks of death
or physical injury over which he has no influence, like a person who likes to travel on
commercial airlines because he enjoys taking the risk of a crash, is as foreign to the avid
sportsman as he would be to any life-preferring or health-preferring person. The justification for the proposed rule does not rest on the possibility that an occasional patron may
generally prefer risks. Because the proposed rule is to be applied to all patrons, arguments
for enforcing releases only when they are signed by a fraction of patrons with unusual
characteristics are not discussed.
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Even those patrons who do not expect to have an opportunity to
protect themselves are not necessarily acting irrationally when
they sign a release. These patrons may rationally fear that without the release the vendor will be driven by his liability for negligence to take precautions that the patrons feel impair their enjoyment of the activity and for that reason are not cost-justified.
For example, some vendor precautions-like running chairlifts
especially slowly to reduce still further the risk of a lift collapsemay not be cost-justified in a patron's eyes because they impair
the benefits of the recreation. However, the vendor and that patron may fear that judges and juries will fail to appreciate fully
the cost of the precaution, will wrongly deem that precaution
cost-justified, and will find the vendor who fails to run the lift
that slowly negligent. Signing the release may be the best way for
patrons to keep that risk of judicial error from driving the vendor
to take the precaution. Again, enforcing the release in this instance allows patrons to prefer their own more informed estimate
of the benefits and costs of a vendor precaution to the judicial estimate. While the proposed rule voids the release in this context-the patron not having a significant opportunity for selfprotection-it does so because of the added importance in these
contexts of preserving the incentive for vendor precaution-taking.
It does not do so on the ground that the patron's decision to sign
was irrational.
As previously suggested, recreational contexts where the patron retains a significant opportunity for self-protection overlap to
a great extent with those recreational contexts where the patron's
challenge of protecting himself is an inseparable and often desirable part of the recreational experience. When part of what the
patron is buying is the challenge of protecting himself, the patron
probably does not want the vendor taking every precaution to
minimize that challenge which a judge and jury could deem costjustified. When vendor care can easily destroy the challenge, the
patron may not desire the vendor care that the duty of ordinary
care requires. More likely, the patron merely wants the vendor to
offer the activity in a manner that allows the patron to tailor the
risks to his desires. Beyond that, the patron probably expects the
vendor to avoid outrageously endangering his safety and to attempt to come to his rescue should an accident occur. Accordingly,
the proposed rule may comply more closely with the expectations
of the parties than a rule imposing liability merely on a finding of
vendor negligence. At the least, the difficulty of applying the
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Learned Hand test for negligence to vendor behavior in this context should lead courts to abandon the attempt. Applying the
Learned Hand test would require separating vendor behavior
that increases risk in a manner which preserves or enhances the
patron's challenge of protecting himself-thereby enhancing the
activities' recreational benefits-from that vendor behavior which
increases risks in a manner that judges and juries can rightly
condemn as negligent.
No proposed rule should be advanced without sensitivity to the
practical limits of adjudication. One of those limits is the need for
what Rudolph von Ihering called high "formal realizability."3 43 By
formal realizability, von Ihering meant the facility and certainty
of applying the abstract rule to concrete cases.3" A rule has high
formal realizability when courts can easily identify the criteria of
the rule in the concrete fact patterns likely to come before
them.3 45 Rudolph von Ihering contrasts the desirably high formal
realizability of a rule such as-the beneficiary shall assume the
management of the trust when he reaches the age of twentyone-with the undesirably low formal realizability of a rule such
as-the beneficiary shall assume the management of the trust
when he acquires the maturity and judgment to regulate his own
affairs.34 6 The lower the formal realizability of a rule, the greater
the decision-making costs it imposes on the legal system.34 7 By
this measure, a rule calling on courts to ascertain whether an injury from a recreational activity occurred during a phase of the
activity which is generally patron-influenced would seem to possess acceptably high formal realizability. The lack of any need for
a court to ascertain the individual patron's knowledge or appreciation of the risk should render the rule easier to apply than
were any versions of the assumption of risk defense. Likewise,
the test proposed here seems easier to administer and less openended than a test of whether the patron was the cheaper precaution-taker. The test proposed avoids any need for a court to consider the precautions both parties could take and to then compare
the relative costs of those precautions.

343.

R. VON IHERING, DER GEIST DAS ROMISCHEN RECHT [THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW]

114 (4th ed. 1954).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 115.
346. See id. at 117.
347. See id.
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Although a social wish to spread losses is said to support vendor liability, the content of this loss-spreading argument is not
clear. Insurance considerations aside, there is no reason to believe vendors, typically small and medium-sized businesses, are
inherently less averse to the risk of liability than the individual
patrons are averse to the risks of injury. If the vendor and patron
are equally risk averse, then protecting vendors from the liability
risk by denying liability and protecting patrons from the injury
risk by imposing liability benefit social welfare equally. If the
loss-spreading argument is that liability insurance is more readily available to vendors than first party injury insurance is available to patrons, the argument's premise is dubious. We have already discussed the difficulties vendors may face in obtaining
liability insurance for their activities. 3 4 There is a distinct possibility the activities in question became less available for sportsmen because liability insurance became less available for vendors. In contrast, patrons are able to obtain first party insurance
protection against their injury through many vehicles. Health insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, sick pay, unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, and life insurance, may all satisfy this purpose. And typically these first
party methods, because they protect against generally described
risks, will be broad enough to cover any injury from the recreational activity. Moreover, full insurance coverage for either the
vendor or the patron is not socially desirable as long as that party
349
can, through its behavior, influence the patron's injury risk.
No doubt the greatest disadvantage in enforcing releases
whenever patrons have a significant opportunity for selfprotection lies in the reduced incentive for vendor care. But other
concerns than the wish to avoid tort liability will continue to provide that incentive. News of injury to a particular vendor's patrons often spreads to consumers quickly and widely through a
number of channels. Economists have demonstrated that if patrons or, in the case of child patrons, their parents have good information about a vendor's safety record, their preference for
safety alone will provide adequate incentive for that vendor to be
careful. 35" The extent to which vendors advertise their safety sug348.
349.
350.
patrons

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 284-307.
See SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 210-12. See generally Schwartz, supra note 123.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 284-307. A tort remedy is needed less when
can punish negligent vendors by refusing to deal with them; it is needed more
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gests consumer preference for safety is more than a theoretical
concern. Day care centers and camps for children engage in an
ongoing struggle to persuade parents that children left in their
care will be safe. A bad reputation for safety can be fatal for these
vendors. Many vendors such as ski areas believe their success
hinges on attracting novices. And the safety concerns of novicesmany of whom overestimate the risks of skiing-have led ski areas to develop and to advertise their safety features. Some pressure for safety even comes from rival vendors and trade associations because injuries to the patrons of one vendor typically tar
the safety reputation of similar vendors. Moreover, trade associations for nearly every category of vendors promulgate safety
standards to guide their members and, at least, to keep them informed of the latest safety information and precautions. In addition, many vendors are already subject to government safety
regulations and many others are subject to the threat of government regulation should patron injuries increase. And, of course,
tort liability's power to deter outrageous vendor behavior will remain unchanged. Indeed the liability burden of vendors in this
country will almost certainly continue to exceed that of their
counterparts in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan despite the roughly equal safety record of the vendors in
all these countries.3 5 1
The proposed rule economizes on administrative costs. When it
applies, it avoids the costs to society of deciding the issues of negligence, cause-in-fact, and proximate cause-both in the injured
patron's prima facie case against the vendor and in the vendor's
contributory negligence defense. It also avoids the costs of assessing damages and of allocating fault among the parties. As releases in patron-influenced activities become routinely enforced,
the use of releases should spread, thus keeping a larger number
of accidents out of the tort system altogether. Despite the widespread notion that the value of the tort system to society increases with the amount of liability imposed, these administra-

when parties do not have contractual dealings with the negligent party. Cf H.R. Moch Co.
v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928) (finding that a tort action against a
negligent waterworks company was not needed, in part because the third party city can
punish a negligent waterworks company by terminating the contract with it).
351. See Schwartz, supra note 105, at 28, 47-51 (stating that liability insurance premiums in these countries are typically one-ninth the premiums of those supplying the same
services or products in the United States).
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tive savings recommend the proposed rule as strongly as a corresponding, and equally likely, savings in accident costs would
recommend a pro-patron rule.
V. CONCLUSION

"Hersin is her lifelessness."
Bob Dylan
The avid sportsman mentioned here resembles in some ways
that archetypal figure so famous in the law of torts-the reasonable person.35 2 The avid sportsman prepares for his participantinfluenced recreational activities. Before beginning a new activity, his preparation entails not only reading or instruction but
identifying the physical exercises especially tailored for that activity. Having done so, he expects to work on those exercises and
to train for his activity no matter how often he has engaged in it
safely in the past. His preparation is guided throughout by what
he has learned over his lifetime about his particular abilities and
vulnerabilities. When his children are to engage in participantinfluenced recreational activities, he insists that they prepare in
the same spirit.
The avid sportsman is intensely aware of the world of the
senses. He appreciates the aesthetic qualities of the physical
world. He relishes sensation and his moments of sensation may
provide much of his happiness. He may never experience the
happiness connected with compelling states of being or with notions of virtue and achievement. Indeed his relish of sensation
may be a desperate and momentary consolation for his failure to
experience that happiness. He may also feel his mastery of sporting technique adds some form or order to his life. He knows his
relish of sensation may conflict with his natural human reaction
of compassion for the injured, but he also knows he must not succumb to that reaction. Toward recreational vendors he feels the
deepest gratitude; they help him enjoy his life. Their prices for
the most part merely carry the message of their regrettably high
costs. He views them as a table-setter, and often fellow reveler, in
life's feast. He does not view them as his nanny. Unless they are
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subjecting him to risks against which he cannot protect himself,
he does not want them taking every precaution for his safety that
a judge, jury, or liability insurer may deem cost-justified.
As suggested by his willingness to prepare against it, the avid
sportsman never wants the risk of injury to materialize. As the
reasonable man's motto was "safety first,"" 3 his motto is "protect
yourself at all times." He expects to use his influence over the
risks and his knowledge of his own limitations to that end. Nevertheless, he accepts that the risk of injury adds to the relish.
Should computers some day offer virtual skiing or the virtual
counterpart of his other activities, he at least will find the activities, absent the risk of injury, boring. Why this is so he may not
know. Perhaps risk taking confronts in dramatic terms his mortality and seems more appropriate the more he realizes his mortality. In any event the avid sportsman acknowledges that at
some point in his recreational activities he will probably be injured. Should he be lucky enough to retain a chance of recovering
from his injury, he expects to devote his energy to that end. As
long as his injury occurred in a context where he could have influenced the risk and did not result from outrageous behavior, he
does not expect to sue.
To the avid sportsman the last four decades bring a sigh. Before then every stop along the road of any substance, indeed
nearly every motel and hotel, offered him at the end of a hot and
humid summer day a diving board. And he knew the more he labored in the heat, the more intense the rush awaiting him when
he finally broke the water's surface with his first gainer, swan, or
jackknife. Back then, stables rented horses, occasionally with
spirit, to whose undistracted personality the avid sportsman
could introduce himself in the serenity of an unaccompanied ride.
Back then, ski areas featured their most precipitous expert runs
and deliberately left them, along with many intermediate runs,
ungroomed.
Of all the legal principles that poisoned the pleasure of the avid
sportsman, none was more pernicious than the principle that a
vendor is negligent whenever he neglected a precaution that is
cost-justified only because it would have better protected the foolish, drunken, and unprepared patron. In practice, although not in
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theory, this principle disenfranchised the avid sportsman. It rendered him invisible in the eyes of the law. It meant, for instance,
that when the foolish or drunken, having been injured, advanced
some precaution which the vendor could have easily and cheaply
taken for their benefit, only a rare judge would appreciate the
sportsman's interest in leaving the activity as it was and in dealing with the activities' risks. Perhaps, however, the sportsman's
true enemy was the negligence concept itself. Perhaps courts and
juries applying the negligence concept in the face of an injured
patron cannot be expected to add to the other costs of a proposed
precaution the extent to which it will lead liability insurers to
suck the life from the recreational activity in question or to eliminate that activity altogether.
By routinely enforcing releases for patron-influenced activities,
the proposed rule allows courts to escape the disadvantages of the
negligence concept when those disadvantages are most acute. The
proposed rule substitutes an approach which may prove workable
and which accords all patrons the dignity of being deemed capable of standing behind their promises.

